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Symposium ____________________ _ 
Professor Louis Henkin: The First 
Thomas Jefferson Lecturer 
Former University of Pennsylvania 
Law School Professor Louis Henkin 
returned during the week of February 
21-25 as the Law School's first 
Thomas Jefferson Lecturer. 
Professor Henkin, a foremost expert 
on the laws related to foreign relations 
and to the U.S. Constitution and pres-
ently a Professor at Columbia Univer-
sity Law School, delivered a senes of 
lectures on human rights entitled " The 
Age of Rights" during his weeklong 
visit. Individual lectures in that senes 
addressed the topics: ''The Idea of 
Rights" and "The Law of Rights" . 
Mr. Henkin also attended Law School 
classes and conducted a seminar in 
addition to meeting informally with the 
students. 
The Thomas Jefferson LeCtures 
were initiated to attract leaders in the 
field of law to spend an extended 
period of time in residence at the . 
School. The Lecture Series is funded 1n 
part by a grant from the Philadelphia 
firm of Spector, Cohen, Gadon & 
Rosen. 
New Gift to Benefit Legal 
Writing Program 
The Raynes, McCarty, Binder, Ross 
and Mundy Legal Writing Instructor-
ship has been established by that 
Philadelphia law firm to be used an-
nually to support the Law School's 
legal writing fund. It is fashioned after 
the Arthur Littleton Fund, which was 
founded by the lawyers of Morgan, 
Lewis and Bockius to honor their late 
partner, Arthur Littleton, '20. 
Arthur G. Raynes, in announcing the 
Raynes, McCarty, Ross and Mundy 
Legal Writing Instructorship said "our 
firm is pleased to be associated with 
this Program, and we would be doubly 
pleased if our gift serves to enlist other 
firms to follow our example." 
Thomas J. Eicher, '83, is the first 
Raynes, McCarty, Binder, Ross and 
Mundy Legal Writing Instructor. 
The I. Grant Irey Memorial Fund 
To honor the memory of I. Grant lrey, 
Jr. '60 the Law School has created a 
F~nd .,'the income of which will permit the 
expansion of curricular offerings in the 
field of Business Law including, par-
ticularly, offerings related to financial in-
stitutions, by providing funds to attract 
lecturers who have had substantial ex-
periences in the practice." The Fund 
shall also be used to support research 
and writing in the area of Business 
Law. 
During his illustrious legal career, . 
Grant lrey, a partner in the Philadelphia 
firm of Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, 
was a distinguished counselor to cor-
porations and banks. The I. Grant lrey 
Memorial Fund will best reflect Mr. 
lrey's interest in the law, and his affec-
tion for and pride in the Un1vers1ty of 
Pennsylvania Law School. 
WATCH FOR YOUR INVITATION 
TO THE PENN LAW ALUMNI RE-
CEPTION TO BE HELD DURING 
THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA-
TION MEETINGS IN ATLANTA, 
GEORGIA-JULY 28-AUGUST 4, 
1983 
Transitions and New Faces 
Geraldine Higgs, the Law School 's 
new Admissions Officer replaces 
Frances Spurgeon, Assistant Dean for 
Admissions. Ms. Higgs, a twenty-year 
employee of the University of Penn: 
sylvania, has worked in the Adm1ss1ons 
Office of the Graduate School of Edu-
cation and has been Assistant to the 
Chairman of the History Department 
since 1975. 
Gloria Watts, former Assistant to 
Vice-Dean Margo P. Marshall , is the 
Law School's new Assistant Registrar, 
replacing Registrar Gary Clinton. 
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Symposium----------------------
The Annual Judges' Reception 
The Board of Managers of the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Alumni 
Society presented its eighth annual Re-
ception on November 30, 1983 for Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law School 
students and Philadelphia Court of 
Common Pleas Judges and their law 
clerks at City Hall. 
The event, organized and hosted an-
nually by Judge Doris May Harris, '49, 
offers Penn Law students the oppor-
tunity to meet informally with members 
of the Philadelphia Trial Bench and to 
become acquainted with the clerkship 
program available after graduation. 
Bernard Barish, lt3, President of the Law Alumni 
Society greets guests at Annual Judges' Reception 
Judge Doris May Harris stands at the left. 
Students attending Judges' Reception converse with Judge Kendall H. Shoyer, '29, 
left center, and Judge George]. Ivins, right. 
The Dean Becomes a Phi Delta Phi 
Dean Robert H. Mundheim was in-
itiated into the Penn Chapter of Phi 
Delta Phi Legal Fraternity in February, 
1983. Serving as Chancellor of the 
Bench was Associate Professor and 
Associate Dean Stephen B. Burbank. 
The Gibson-Alexander Inn of Phi Delta 
Phi was reactivated in 1981 after a 47 
year absence from the Law School. 
Last year's Honorary Initiates included 
Professors Covey T. Oliver and Clyde 
W. Summers, and Dr. Sadie T. M. 
Alexander, '27. 
.16112ipf..;{-i 1PfiC 
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Quinquennial Reunion Weekend-
October 15-16, 1983 
Alumni from the Classes of 1978, 
1973, 1968, 1963, 1958, 1953, 1948, 
1943, 1938 and 1933 will be celebra-
ting milestone reunions in October dur-
ing the Law School's annual Quin-
quennial Reunion Weekend. 
Beginning on Saturday morning, Oc-
tober 15, all of the reunion classes will 
gather for a light breakfast to be fol-
lowed by a program featuring Law 
School Faculty and Alumni . A lun-
cheon at the University's Faculty Club 
will be held after the morning activities. 
In the evening, each class will con-
vene separately and celebrate at area 
restaurants and hotels of their choices. 
To complete the weekend's festivities, 
Sunday brunch will be offered at Eden, 
a restaurant on campus . 
The officers of each Quinquennial 
Class already have been contacted by 
the Law School's Alumni office and 
reunion plans are in progress. Watch 
the mails for specifics! 
Exhibit Featuring Women Displayed 
in Great Hall 
"100 Years of University of Penn-
sylvania Law School Women': an ex-
traordinary exhibit researched and 
prepared by Biddle Law Library 
Reference Librarian, Nancy Arnold, is 
on view in The Great Hall of the Law 
School. Of special note are the por-
trait/posters of Alumnae Carrie 
Burnham Kilgore, 1883, and Margaret 
Center Klingelsmith, '1898, which 
appear in the showcases at the 
School's entrance. 
The Women's Law Group 
Conference-Changing Labor Laws: 
Lawyers Working With Working 
Women 
The Women's Law Group at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania sponsored a 
day-long conference on Saturday 
March 5, 1983 on the impact of labor 
and employment laws on working 
women. The recent influx of women 
into the labor force has raised many 
new issues relevant to both women 
and men. These issues have gener-
ated legal controversies and some of 
these issues, such as sexual harass-
ment that were once outside the scope 
of the legal process, are now being 
recognized as legal problems with 
legal solutions. 
The Conference explored the many 
developments in labor and employ-
ment statutes, regulations, and judicial 
decisions with the purpose to under-
stand the implications for working 
women and their attorneys. Partici-
pants were drawn from a variety of 
backgrounds and perspectives includ-
ing practicing lawyers, law school pro-
fessors, law students, management 
and union representatives, and 
government officials. 
Carol Bellamy, President of the New 
York City Council, presented the open-
ing address on Saturday morning. For 
the rest of the day, nine workshops 
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were available to participants: Organiz-
ing Working Women, Comparable 
Worth, Women's Health and Safety in 
the Workplace, Women's Issues in Col-
lective Bargaining, Sexual Politics, 
What is an "Equal Opportunity Em-
ployer"?, Labor and Employment 
Legislation, Litigation Strategies for 
Labor and Employment Lawyers, and 
Employment Policies and Law: An 
International Perspective. The pan-
elists, representing the academic com-
munity, government agencies, corpo-
rations, and labor unions, made brief 
presentations on the specified topic 
based on his/her experiences and re-
search, and then opened the forum for 
discussion to the audience. 
Among the contributors to the Con-
ference were University of Penn-
sylvania Law Professors Drucilla 
Cornell, Virginia Kerr '76, Edward 
Sparer and Clyde Summers; and U ni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Alumni 
Peggy Browning, '82, Wendella P. Fox, 
'76, William Whiteside, '54, Stephanie 
Middleton, '81, Julie Shapiro, '82 and 
Paula Markowitz, '52. Also participat-
ing was Professor Fujio Hamada, who 
is on a Fulbright Commission grant at 
the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School and is a professor of labor law 
at Kobe University in Japan. 
The Conference was sponsored 
by the University of Pennsylvania 
Women's Law Group, the National 
Lawyers Guild, the United Auto 
Workers, the Bell Telephone Company 
of Pennsylvania and the America Fed-
eration of State, County and Municipal 
Employees. 
The Second Annual Conference 
on Public Interest Law 
The Law School's annual Public In-
terest Law Conference entitled "New 
Approaches to Law in the Public In-
terest'' was held on March 25-26, 
1983. This year's conference featured 
numerous important legal academics 
and practitioners, as well as individuals 
from other disciplines and experiences. 
Its focus was geared toward develop-
ing a definition of "public interest law" 
and an understanding of the conditions 
necessary for the practice of law in the 
public interest. Another important 
aspect of the two-day conference was 
to enable law students to interact with 
(ll6' 
~k (' ~ OUfJ" ,y, 
\'-L ... __ -
Janet Bayer, '84, left and Jenny McGill, '84 right. 
practitioners in order to discuss, ex-
plore and appreciate the problems and 
joys facing those involved in the prac-
tice of public interest law. 
Father Robert F. Drinan, former 
member of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives and now Professor of Law at 
Georgetown University Law School, 
delivered the keynote address. Law 
School Faculty participants included 
Professors Regina Austin, C. Edwin 
Baker, Paul Bender, Drucilla Cornell, 
Robert Gorman, Courtney Howland, 
Seth Kreimer, Stephen Schulhofer, 
Ralph Smith , Edward V. Sparer, and 
Clyde Summers. 
Other eminent participants were 
Dean Derrick Bell, of the Oregon Law 
School ; Professor Howard Lesnick, of 
the CUNY Law School at Queen's Col-
lege; Professor Sylvia Law of the New 
York University Law School; Professor 
Barbara Underwood of the Yale Law 
School; Professor Rand Rosenblatt of 
the Rutgers-Camden Law School; and 
Professor Karl Klare of the North-
eastern University Law School. Alumni 
taking part in the various panel discus-
sions were: David Kairys, '71, David 
Ferleger, '72, Eleanor Myers, '75, John 
Parvensky, '79, Howard Gittis, '58, 
Benjamin Lerner, '65, Howard L. 
Shecter, '68, and Holly Maguigan, '72. 
Community organizations were 
represented at the Conference by 
Richard Weishaupt, an attorney with 
Community Legal Services; Louise 
Brookins, President of the Welfare 
Rights Organization; Karen Burstein, 
Executive Director of the Consumer 
Protection Board of Pennsylvania; 
Margaret Fung of the Asian-American 
Legal Defense and Education Fund; 
John Pettit, Director of Tri-County 
Neighbors Association, Inc.; Juan 
Sanchez, organizer of Hispanic Farm-
workers in Eastern Pennsylvania; Jack 
Zucker of the Gray Panthers; Dan Burt, 
President of the Capital Legal Founda-
tion; Jerry Balter, Director of the Public 
Interest Law Center of Philadelphia; 
Antonia Hernandez, Associate Counsel 
of the Mexican-American Legal De-
fense Fund; Lowell Johnson of the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education 
Fund; Sara Rosenbaum, Senior Health 
Specialist, Children's Defense Fund; 
Jody Smith, Executive Director, Na-
tional Legal Aid and Defender Associa-
tion; Elizabeth Schneider, who is with 
the Constitutional Law Clinic at 
Rutgers-Newark Law School; and 
Sherman Kreiner, attorney and Ex-
ecutive Director of the Philadelphia 
Association for Cooperative Enter-
prises. Additional contributors to the 
conference who are practitioners from 
the Philadelphia area engaged in 
public interest law were: Robert 
Sugarman, David Rudovsky, Judy 
Chomsky, Thomas McGill, Pat Pierce 
and Greg Sleet. Sylvia Brown, a 
member of the University of Penn-
sylvania Law School Class of 1984, 
moderated at one of the workshops. 
The subjects of the Conference's 
debates and panel discussions in-
cluded "Social Purpose of the Law", 
"Legal Education and the Public Inter-
est: Law and Society", and "Public In-
terest Law: Race, Class and Sex''. The 
workshops under the broad heading of 
"New Approaches to Public Interest 
Law" included: Solo and Small Firm 
Practice, Alternative Delivery Mecha-
nisms, Private Bar Pro Bono Work, A 
New Look at Traditional Public Interest 
Law Practice, Criminal Justice Practice 
and How Do Community Organizations 
Look at Lawyers? 
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Symposium 
Judge Phyllis W. Beck Addressed 
Woman's Law Group 
Judge Phyllis Beck, former Vice-
Dean of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School for the years 1976- 1981 
and, presently, the fi rst woman to sit on 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
bench, spoke with members of the 
Women 's Law Group on February 4, 
1983. In her message, the Judge 
traced her life experiences prior to at-
tending law school (as a writer and, 
later, the mother of four children) ; her 
subsequent careers as a practicing 
lawyer (working both part- and full-
time), as a law professor (the head of 
the Temple University Law School 's 
Clinical Program for two years) , and as 
a Law School Administrator (the Vice-
Dean of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School for five years); and, finally, 
her " journey to the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court bench", for which she 
is seeking reelection in the May 17th 
primary contest. 
Judge Beck described how she was 
able to successfully manage both a 
career and a family-an issue of great 
moment to many of the women law 
students assembled and, in the 
Judge's opinion, " a problem that has 
not been addressed sufficiently by 
women and the women 's movement" . 
The Judge suggested that today's 
career-minded women must decide 
" whether or not they wish to marry 
and/or whether or not they want to 
bear children ", then be ready to ac-
cept the attendant responsibilities built 
into the task of child-rearing . Women 
4 
who opt for such a lifestyle might want 
to try the route of the part time 
employee in a law firm ; few firms, 
however, have exhibited the will-
ingness to be flexible in such situa-
tions. In addition, parttime employees, 
once accepted into a firm, are less 
likely to rise in a firm 's power structure. 
Following her provocative and 
stimulating presentation, Judge Beck 
entertained comments and questions 
from the group. 
Cyrus Vance to be 
1984 Roberts Lecturer 
The 1984 Owen J. Roberts Memorial 
Lecture will be delivered on February 
23, 1984 by Cyrus R. Vance, former 
U.S. Secretary of State. The Winter 
1983 Law Alumni Journal erroneously 
announced Mr. Vance as the 1984 
Thomas Jefferson Lecturer. 
The Dean's Calendar 
Chief Justice Roberts is Third 
Alumni Luncheon Forum Lecturer 
Chief Justice Samuel J. Roberts, 
'31, of the Pennsylvania State 
Supreme Court, will deliver the third 
lecture in this year 's Philadelphia 
Region Alumni Luncheon Series at 
12:00, Wednesday, April 27, 1983 at 
the PNB Concourse, Broad and 
Chestnut Streets. Chief Justice Roberts ' 
speech is titled '' Reflections' '. 
Irving S. Shapiro , the Chair of the 
Law School's Board of Overseers and 
the first of this year's lecturers, spoke 
on " The Mid-East Peace Proposal : A 
Personal View" in November 1982. 
The second lecture was delivered in 
February, 1983 by Penn Law Pro-
fessor Clyde W. Summers, whose ad-
dress, " Municipal Employees and 
Strikes", appears in this issue of the 
Journal. 
Dean Robert H. Mundheim looks forward to meeting and becoming better-
acquainted with Alumni at the following scheduled Alumni events, Law Alumni 
Society functions and Bar Association and. professional meetings: 
January 7, 1983 .... Alumni Breakfast at Meetings of American Association 
of Law Schools, Cincinnati 
February 1 . . Law Alumni Society Alumni Second Luncheon Forum, 
Philadelphia 
March 1 . ..... .. .. . Northern New Jersey Alumni Dinner 
March 3 . . . . . Southern New Jersey Alumni Dinner 
March 30 . . .. . . . . . . Los Angeles, California Alumni Luncheon 
April 9 . . .. . . .. . .. . Black Law Students Union Alumni Program and Dinner 
April 11 .. . . . . ... . . Allentown, Bethlehem, Easton Alumni Reception 
April 12 . . .. .... . . . World Affairs Council Circle-Law School 
April 19 ... .. .. .... Law Alumni Day 
April 22 ........... New York Alumni Luncheon at New York Bar Associa-
tion Meetings 
April 27 .. .. . .. .. .. Law Alumni Society's Third Alumni Luncheon Forum , 
Philadelphia 
April 29 .. . ... . .... Law School Class of 1931 Dinner honoring Chief 
Justice Samuel J. Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court. 
May 4 . . . . .. . . . . . . Law Alumni Reception at the Pennsylvania Bar 
Association Meetings, Hershey, Pennsylvania 
May 11 ...... .. . .. Akron-Cleveland , Oh io Law Alumni Luncheon 
May 12 ........... Chicago Alumni Luncheon 
May 13 .. ... .. . . .. New Jersey Alumni Reception at the New Jersey Bar 
Association Meetings, Atlantic City 
May 20 . .......... Washington , D.C. Alumni Luncheon during All 
Meetings 
May 23 ........... Law School Commencement 
July 28- August 4 ABA Meetings-Atlanta, Georgia 
October 15- 16 .... . Quinquennial Reunion Weekend 
6
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Where are These Lost Alumni? 
We have no record of the whereabouts of the following Alumni. Would anyone with information on the law firms and/or 
home addresses of these lost classmates (and/or other listed Alumni) please write to Lost Alumni, c/o The Alumni Office, 
The University of Pennsylvania Law School, 3400 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, PA 19104 or call (215) 898-6321? 
'28 Maurice W. Kail Douglas H. Kiesewetter '64 Linda Ridi* Richard M. Stone 
John J. K. Smith Martin Price Gordon D. Simonds Robert K. Vincent, Jr. 
'29 Joseph R. Applebaum '50 John J. Dailey '65 Paul R. Bracciotti '71 Richard E. Beeman 
'30 Horacia Casasus Norvin Nathan Vincent A. Carbonar Mirza A. M. Beg* 
H. G. Lowenstein '51 Robert I. Goldman Gustavo A. Gelpi Jules E. Bernard Ill James H. Johns, Jr. Karl W. Heckman Charles Nelson Moffett Harry A. Ruber John E. Kolofolias James R. Magee Andrew J. Schroder 2nd J. Dallas Shepherd Harihar A. Patel Joel W. Messing 
'31 Nathan Agran Raymond G. Simkins David P. Ross Steven P. Rapoport 
Alexander Katzin Maj. John Teselle Peter V. Savage Joel P. Sternfeld 
Phillip A. Sheaff Jr. William F. Trapnell Robert M. Washburn* '66 Lung Fong Chen* 
'32 Mr. William L. Carranza '52 Joseph J. Hennessy P. V. Grimaldi Geoffrey A. Wilson* 
Edward Hartzell '53 Edwin C. Bradford Diedre Mummery Davies* '72 Andrew J. Duell 
Dorothea Burns Lamb R. R. Johnson, Jr. Peter B. Dublin Elizabeth M. Freedman 
·Bernard S. Magen Philip Shuchman Morton J. Goldfein Stephen J. Mills 
'33 Sidney H. Kanig '56 Shirley S. Bitterman 
John P. Howland John M. Myers 
Robert M. Rosenblum Dr. Ayala Procaccia* Milton Kunken Dr. Simeon N. Ferrer* Albert F. Watters, Jr. Dr. Uriel Procaccia* Cpl. Benjamin J. Lipetz Hubert G. Francois* Richard W. Sherman Anthony J. Sweeney Jr. Robert J. Williams '67 James N. Albert Richard A. Siegal 
'34 John E. Boland '57 Stylianos Nestor* 
Jeffrey L. Dow Peter J. Tobiason Franklin D. Grabill Aaron Eisenstein Juan C. Puig* Frederick G. Hilmer* Fisseha F. Yimer 
'35 Samuel H. Kaplan '58 Irwin Albert Takashi Maeda* '73 Michael J. Kalison 
'36 Joseph Kaufman Arthur M. Dolin Shibru Seifu Margaret D. McGaughey 
M. Philips Nathanson Dr. Muhammad H. Elfarra* Marvin M. Witofsky '74 Leslie G. Dias 
John M. Smith Jr. Baron E. Kessler '68 Michael P. Friedman Martin J. Genauer 
Leonard R. Titelman James A. Loughran Hugh P. Glukenhous Hollis T. Hurd 
Lt. Col. James A. Mounts, Jr. Norman L. Goldberg 
'37 Gene A. Bortz Mr. Howard I. Oken Alan R. Goodman '75 Lodewijk A. Briet, Jr.* 
Mr. Charles J. Donohue Y. Evan Synnestvedt Romer Holleran Willie L. Dawkins 
Walter L. Oskierko Howard H. Ward David N. Kunkel James A. Young Ill 
Harry K. Wampole 
'59 Jose D. Concepcion* Jonathan S. Paulson '76 Cheryl A. Crandall 
'38 Harvey L. Panetta Margaret Adam Halaby Harold J. Pokel Charles M. Deese 1-
Charles H. Harris J. H. Vanmerkensteijn Ill Edward J. Vairo '39 Ruth Bonnelly McMahon 
Carl V. Kapp '69 Lesley Frost Behrendt* '77 John Y. C. Beckwith Harry Richman 
Albert W. Laisy Herbert Beigel Richard Boydston 
'40 Thos M. H. Broomall Joseph R. McFate 2nd Henry R. Cooper* Nemecio E. Lopez, Jr. 
Maurice H. Kirshner 
'60 H. Chester Grant John B. Galus '78 Robin F. Hollington* Henry Larzelere Richard George 
Albert E. Turner Jr. C. Zachary Seltzer* John F. Hayes* Michael C. Kwang* Charles M. Stonehill Albert D. Woodward 
'41 Leon W. Gore Michael F. Walsh James C. Lahore* 
Darthea Speyer Frank L. Langhammer '79 Saul Mandel 
'61 Neal J. Auspitz Ellen E. Mosen John H. Palmer, Jr. 
'42 Norva T. Cummings 
'62 Michael Barkow Alice Graham Rhodes '80 Kyung J. Park* Mr. Dennis J. Lane Peter K. Speert 
Robert L. Miller '63 Jonathan B. Baker Krishna M. Vempaty* '81 Linda R. Fannin 
'43 James G. Moore Michael M. Becker Douglas M. Yorke* Edwin Montes 
Edward A. Comerton* 
'70 William A. Bachmann Jose R. Paz Padilla* '48 Robert F. Conrad Cesar L. Coronado* • Denotes LL.M. graduate 
Charles B. Selak Jr. Mahmood A. Faruqui* James A. Burke 
Guido Fienga* Kenneth L. Fredrickson '49 Alex L. Fricke Samuel M. Glasser 
Irvin J. Good John M. Flackett* Harry C. Jackson Michael A. Grean Hugh H. Howard 
Robert C. Littman Walter M. Lowney* Warren M. Jones 
Bernard Raoul Yochim Susan G. Marion Morton Kaplan Christopher Norall 
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Professor Mishkin is 1982 Roberts Lecturer 
6 
Professor and Mrs. Mishkin, center, with Alumni including the Honorable 
Norma L. Shapiro, '51. 
Professor Mishkin, center, with Bernard Barish, ~3, left, 
President of the Law Alumni Society, and Dean Robert H. 
Mundheim. 
Paul J. Mishkin, Emanuel S. Heller 
Professor of Law at the University of 
California School of Law, Berkeley, 
and former Professor of Law at the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, 
delivered the Owen J. Roberts 
Memorial Lecture on October 21, 
1982. Mr. Mishkin's Lecture, The Uses 
of Ambivalence: Reflections on the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional-
ity of Affirmative Action, will appear in 
its entirety in The University of Penn-
sylvania Law Review, Volume 131 No. 
4 April1983. 
Professor Mishkin joins the cadre of 
illustrious former Roberts Lecturers 
which include distinguished Judges 
Felix Frankfurter, Henry J. Friendly, 
William H. Hastie and Arthur Goldberg; 
eminent scholars Arthur L. Goodheart, 
Herbert Wechsler, Covey Oliver, Erwin 
Griswald, Paul Freund; renowned 
diplomats Paul Henri Spaak and Abba 
Eban; and esteemed practitioners An-
thony Lester, Q.C. and Sidney Kent-
ridge, S.C. 
The Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lec-
ture Series is sponsored by the Penn-
sylvania Chapter of The Order of The 
Coif, the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Alumni Society and The Law 
School. Support for the series is pro-
vided by an endowment given by the 
Philadelphia firm of Montgomery, 
McCracken, Walker and Rhoads, in 
memory of their founding partner, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Owen J. 
Roberts. 
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The 1982 Edwin R. Keedy Moot Court Competition 
The Keedy Bench: the Honorable Dolores K. Slaviter, '56, left, the Honorable John J. Gibbons, 
center, and the Honorable Murray M. Schwartz, '55, right. 
Moot Court Winners, Thomas A. Isaacson, '83, and Andrew 
D. Schau , '83. 
Finalists Julie R. Fenster, '83, left, and Marc E. Alterman, '83, right. 
The final argument of the Edwin R. 
Keedy Cup Competition was held on 
November 12 at the University of 
Pennsylvania Museum. 
The distinguished 1982 bench in-
cluded Judge John J. Gibbons, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit, presiding; Judge Dolores K. 
Sloviter, '56, United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit; and Judge 
Murray M. Schwartz, '55 United States 
District Court for the District of Dela-
ware. Former Supreme Court Justice 
Potter Stewart, originally scheduled as 
one of the 1982 judges, canceled his 
commitment due to illness. 
The 1982 case for argument, Lucius 
Claiborne v. State of Montabama, in-
volved a conviction under a state 
statute which required a mandatory 
ten-year prison sentence and a fine of 
$25,000 for persons trafficking large 
quantities of drugs. The state attorney, 
however, could move the sentencing 
court to reduce or to suspend the 
sentence if the person convicted pro-
vided substantial assistance in the 
identification, arrest or conviction of 
any of his accomplices, accessories, 
co-conspirators or principals. The 
defendant in the case contended that 
to escape the statute's mandatory 
penalties, he was forced to give up his 
privilege against self-incrimination . 
The Keedy finalists, all members of 
the Class of 1983, were Marc E. 
Alterman, Julie R. Fenster, Thomas A. 
Isaacson and Andrew D. Schau. The 
arguments presented by both sides 
were acclaimed " of high quality" by 
the judges, but the team of Isaacson 
and Schau, who argued for the ap-
pellee, emerged the victors. 
Professor Ralph S. Spritzer, the Moot 
Court Faculty Advisor, developed the 
case which was based on a Florida 
statute that had been reviewed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
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Our Man For All Seasons 
by Libby S. Harwitz 
Louis B. Schwartz, '35, joined the 
Faculty of this Law School in 1946. In 
June, he will retire from his teaching 
responsibilities at the University of 
Pennsylvania after thirty-seven years, 
and will continue his work at Hastings 
College of the Law in San Francisco, 
California. 
Mr. Schwartz is a legend-a Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law School institu-
tion. Since most of the School's living 
Alumni have experienced him as their 
professor of crimina/law and/or 
economic regulation and/or profes-
sional responsibility, his skills as a 
distinguished, vital and demanding 
educator are already well-known. 
Over the years, many Penn Law 
Alumni have benefitted from Mr. 
Schwartz 's personal interest. As friend 
and mentor, he adopts an almost 
parent-like pride when touting an 
Alumnus ' recently published novel or 
fascinating career change or newly-
acquired editorship or elevation to a 
high position in government or in 
business. 
Lou Schwartz is the quintessential 
Renaissance man-musician, bread-
baker, gadfly/philosopher, book re-
viewer, gardener, author, photog-
rapher, and legal scholar/specialist in 
two areas-crimina/law and economic 
regulation. 
My tenure as JOURNAL editor 
began in 1975 and, from that time to 
the present, Mr. Schwartz has been the 
publications's chief ''idea-person''. 
Lou 's frequent and welcome memos 
offering suggestions that THE 
JOURNAL explore "what members 
of the Penn Law Faculty do during 
summer vacation ", or that it consider 
articles on the "following Alumni" 
whose careers and lives might make 
fascinating copy, were always worthy 
of investigation and implementation. 
The flow of Lou 's fresh and unique 
ideas was endless, and his departure 
will result in the lose of one of 
THE JOURNALS major creative 
sourses. 
Last autumn, Professor Schwartz 
was guest speaker at the 25th Anniver-
sary Reception and Dinner celebration 
of the New York City Alumni Regional 
8 
Club. At that event, in inimitable 
Schwartz-style, he delivered an assess-
ment of his career-including the 
failures as well as the triumphs. Pre-
sented here is that appraisal "of-the-
man-by-the-man" on the occasion of 
his retirement as Benjamin Franklin 
and University Professor of Law, The 
University of Pennsylvania. 
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The Reek of Success: 
Notes of Caution on the Occasion of Eulogies 
by Professor Louis B. Schwartz 
Standing on this platform with Dean 
Robert Mundheim's encomia ringing 
pleasantly in my ears, I cannot sup-
press a perverse impulse to balance 
the picture with a report on the failures 
in my life. It is part of the duty of a pro-
fessor, is it not, to expound the truth, 
the whole truth , and the chiaroscuro of 
light and shade that characterizes real 
as opposed to idealized biography. 
No one could stand here without 
sniffing the reek of success that per-
vades this 25th anniversary occasion. 
You are successes-partners and 
associates in powerful law firms and in 
great enterprises. As you have heard 
from Dean Mundheim, the Law School 
is a great success, with ever-increasing 
multitudes of applicants requesting ad-
mission. The Dean himself reeks of 
success. Leaving behind a splendid in-
terlude at the highest levels of govern-
ment, Bob Mundheim takes charge at 
the Law School with confidence and 
urbanity. 
In the light of the attributes and good 
wishes that many of you-classmates, 
former students, colleagues- have 
privately extended to me, I have no 
alternative but to acknowledge that I 
a/so must reek of success. Academe 
has been very good to me. It has pro-
vided almost unfailing stimulation 
(faculty meetings apart, Mr. Dean) , 
freedom and independence (from 
clients, patrons, bosses), opportunities 
for tax-deductible travel throughout the 
world , the chance to stay young by 
constant encounters with the young 
and the bright, and the leisure time 
and money to build a glorious retreat 
down-East in Maine. Nor has it cut me 
off altogether from the profitable prac-
tice of law. 
When I count my successes, they go 
beyond the public gratifications: my 
publications, my work for the American 
Law Institute as Reporter for the Model 
Penal Code, my participation in the 
National Commission to Study the An-
titrust Laws, my directorship of the Na-
tional Commission on Reform of the 
Federal Criminal Laws. My " private" 
successes, on which I set great store 
and immodestly list before going to the 
failures which are my original theme, 
include the following : In 1963, I per-
suaded the Faculty to establish the 
Law School Honorary Fellow Program 
whereby each year at commencement 
we honor a lawyer who, at the risk of 
his/her career, participated in coura-
geous vindication of civil rights, justice 
for the poor, and resistance to oppres-
sion. These Fellows, whose photo-
graphs and citations are on permanent 
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display in the Law School Lobby, serve 
as models to our students today. 
I inaugurated the program of bridge-
building between the Law School and 
the fine arts, arranging for showings of 
paintings and sculpture by students in 
the University's Graduate School of 
Fine Arts. This year, my suggestion to 
organize an art show featuring mem-
bers of the Law School Community 
and their families came to successful 
fruition. Many others, also, have fol-
lowed these initiatives and, today, the 
Law School is unique in its presenta-
tions of art and music. 
I count among my private ac-
complishments the gracing of our pro-
fessorial offices with lush and exotic 
plantings, my cue having been taken 
from Harvard Professor, Lon Fuller, a 
colleague with whom I taught while at 
that institution in 1964. 
Now for my failures, which are im-
pressive. The greatest, undoubtedly, 
was the collapse of the movement for 
reform of the federal criminal laws. 
Directing the National Commission, 
chaired by former Governor Pat Brown 
of California, was a job for which much 
of my early career in the United States 
Department of Justice, at the American 
Law Institute, and in the teaching of 
criminal law had uniquely prepared 
me; the need was urgent and the 
political sponsorship favorable. The 
high-water mark was reached in 1977 
when Senator Ted Kennedy shep-
herded the reform bill through the 
Senate by a vote of 7 4-15. It was all the 
more agonizing to have the reform ef-
fort frustrated by those who were nor-
mally my political allies, particularly the 
American Civil Liberties Union which 
followed a policy of ali-or-nothing, and 
opposed the reform because it did not 
incorporate every advance that could 
be envisioned. 
Another disappointment that should 
help dispel the " reek of success" was 
my failure to get the essential fourth 
vote for certiorari in the case of 
Schwartz and Segal v. The Defender 
Association of Philadelphia, PA. 353, 
307 A.2d 906,414 U.S. 1079 (1973), 
where I had sought to establish as a 
constitutional principle the complete in-
dependence of public defenders from 
domination by mayors and city coun-
cils affiliated with the police and the 
district attorneys. This disappointment 
was exacerbated by a sneaking feel-
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ing, possibly experienced by all losing 
counsel , that I was partly responsible 
for the defeat. In this situation, my error 
was in overarguing the case in the peti-
tion for certiorari so that a Justice who 
was so inclined could prematurely 
disagree with me on the merits, rather 
than simply recognize that an impor-
tant issue was presented. 
A nagging sense of inadequacy 
which , for the first time I now publicly 
avow, relates to my Supreme Court 
" victory" in Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 
134 (1951) . Appointed to represent the 
prisoner Palmer, who had been 
railroaded into a forty-year sentence for 
a petty burglary charge without benefit 
of counsel , I prevailed with my pre-
Gideon argument that the record 
showed substantial prejudice to 
Palmer's due process rights in view of 
the seriousness of the case, and to his 
youth , inexperience, and limited in-
telligence. When Abe Fortas soon 
thereafter got the Court to accept the 
rule that trial of a serious criminal case 
without counsel was ipso facto a denial 
of due process, Gideon v. Wainright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963), I asked myself 
whether my friends on the Supreme 
Court had not meant to tender me the 
great opportunity, which I had passed 
up, in the view that my single client's 
best interest lay in bringing him within 
the established rule, however 
unsatisfactorily. 
What shall I say of the great 
" liberalization" of the law of abortion 
which I brought about in the Model 
Penal Code of the American Law In-
stitute? Imagine my chagrin when the 
Supreme Court thereafter, in Rowe v. 
Wade, 41 0 U.S. 113 (1973), held that 
my rule was unconstitutionally restric-
tive of women's rights to choose at 
least during the first trimester of 
pregnancy. With much difficulty I per-
suaded the majority of the pundits of 
the Institute to go as far as decrim-
inalizing abortion where the pregnancy 
resulted from rape or incest, or where 
continuance of the pregnancy would 
threaten the life or health of the mother, 
or where the offspring would suffer 
from serious physical handicaps. Think 
how a liberal's pride suffers when his 
reform is held unconscionable in a 
decision backed by such conservative 
stalwarts as Burger, Blackmun and 
Powell! 
My failures in academic reform were 
the hardest to bear. Having stimulated 
the creation at the Law School of a 
" Committee on Teaching" to address 
the problem of widespread student 
alienation and anti-intellectualism; I 
bumped my head against a number of 
stone walls. Projects for an integrated 
rational curriculum were defeated. As I 
told my colleagues, perpetual curricu-
lar revisions here as at other schools 
represent no coherent philosophy of 
education, but only a negotiated multi-
lateral treaty among professorial man-
darins intent on defending their par-
ticular turfs. New subjects are added 
but never at the cost of corresponding 
contractions elsewhere in the curricu-
lum. Consequently, the feeling was that 
" electives" multiply and people 
graduate with glaring omissions in their 
training . Grading systems are installed 
on the principle that nearly half the 
students will be graded merely " pass" 
The avowed purpose is to obscure the 
notable failures of a small percentage 
of the class. Nobody is fooled-neither 
fellow-students, nor prospective 
employers and, most notably, not the 
bar examiners whose pitiless scorings 
almost unerringly pick out our " bare 
passes" and make the School look 
bad as a training ground. The only ef-
fect of misplaced solicitude for a small 
minority is to prejudice a substantial 
portion of the class whom prospective 
employers cannot discriminate from 
"bare passes" . My proposed reform, 
to reestablish a "bare pass" category 
such as exists at peer schools and 
elsewhere in the University, went down 
to defeat. 
At the University level, there were 
dreary episodes when seemingly un-
controversial proposals for improve-
ment foundered on bureaucratic 
inertia. That was the fate of my project 
for upgrading the approaches to the 
University by systematic policing to 
stop slum-lord neglect and trash--
littering. It was the fate, likewise, of my 
earnestly advanced proposal to extend 
the University's physical planning con-
ception to make the neighboring 
historic and beautiful Woodland 
Cemetery a meaningful part of our 
physical environment. 
Such croppers! Such heartaches for 
an " achiever" ! But I must go no fur-
ther. Already, I see tears of sympathy 
coursing down a cheek here and 
there. Is that a strangled sob I hear? I 
must not cause you further distress on 
so happy an occasion. Be assured, 
however, that notwithstanding the 
dolorous tales I have to tell, I really do 
not find the reek of success 
unbearable. 
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Municipal Employees and Strikes 
by Professor Clyde W. Summers 
Editor's Note: 
Clyde W. Summers, the Law School's 
Jefferson B. Fordham Professor of Law, 
received his undergraduate (B.S.) and 
law (J.D.) degrees from the University of 
Illinois, his graduate degrees from Col-
umbia University (S.J.D.) and from the 
University of Stockholm (L.L.D.) as 
well as from the University of Louven 
(L.L.D.) in Belgium. He has been a Gug-
genheim Fellow, a Columbia University 
and a Ford Faculty Fellow, and was 
awarded grants from the National En-
dowment for the Humanities and the 
German Marshall Fund for the year 
1977-1978. Mr. Summers is a nation-
ally-recognized scholar in the field of labor 
law and has authored many works, in-
eluding law review articles, in that area. 
Professor Summers came to the Law 
School in 1975, having spent nineteen 
years at Yale as the Garver Professor of 
Law. In addition to labor law, he teaches 
courses in income security, public 
employee bargaining, individual rights, 
and internal union affairs, along with 
others from time to time. 
In 1979, Mr. Summers was the recip-
ient of the University of Pennsylvania's 
Lindback Award for excellence in 
teaching. 
Professor Summers delivered the 
following lecture, which was the second 
of the Law Alumni Society's Philadelphia 
Region Alumni Luncheon series, on 
February 1, 1983. 
I recognize that no person with mod-
erate sense and minimum caution 
would enter the cross-fire of debate 
over the right of public employees to 
strike. One would be lucky to escape 
undamaged, much less make any 
useful contribution. But so much of the 
debate seems to me to skirt the central 
issues, that I will run the risk with the in-
curable optimist and present a different 
perspective and method of analysis of 
the problem. 
The arguments opposing and sup-
porting the right of public employees to 
strike run in matched pairs. On the one 
side, there are those who oppose the 
use of strikes by public employees 
describing them as violations of the 
state's sovereignty-a form of insurrec-
tion. On the other side, the matched 
argument is of equal profundity , offer-
ing an equal lack of logic-that there is 
a constitutional right to strike. These 
arguments, of course, solve nothing, for 
the problem is not of whether the pro-
hibition of strikes is constitutional but 
of whether they should be allowed. 
In another matched pair of argu-
ments, those who oppose public 
employee strikes project a picture of 
disaster when government closes its 
doors and public services cease-
anarchy reigns. Those on the other 
side point out that a strike on a com-
muter rail line is no different if it is 
owned by SEPTA (The Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transit Authority) or if it is 
owned by the Pennsylvania Railroad; 
or, to use another example, that a 
strike by public school teachers is no 
different from a strike by parochial 
school teachers or teachers at Girard 
College. 
The argument that strikes bring un-
due pressure on government and dis-
tort the political process is matched by 
the argument that strikes must be 
available to make collective bargaining 
work. Finally, the argument that the law 
should not attempt to prohibit strikes 
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because such laws cannot be en-
forced is matched by the argument 
that what we need is better laws and 
the determination to enforce them. 
Running throughout the entire 
debate and through a part of each pair 
of arguments-sometimes submerged 
and sometimes on the surface-are 
assumptions and assertions as to 
whether public employment is similar 
to private employment, whether the 
law and practice in the public sector 
should be the same as that in the 
private sector. The important question, 
however, is not one of comparison or 
transplantability between the public 
and private sectors but rather what 
procedures are appropriate terms and 
conditions of employment for public 
employees, and whether the strike is a 
proper part of those procedures. It is 
this question which we should con-
front directly. 
The starting point, I would suggest, 
is a fundamental principle that is so evi-
dent that it ought not need articulation. 
The central and simple truism is that 
public employees are employees of the 
public; the public is the employer. And 
who is the public? The public consists 
of the citizens and taxpayers who de-
mand the services of their employees 
who pay their wages. The public 
employer is not the mayor, not the city 
council , not even the city as an ab-
straction. The public employer is 
the collectivity of citizens, users and 
taxpayers. 
Citizens, the taxpayers and users of 
services-the members of the public-
behave much like all other employers. 
What they want from their employees is 
more production at lower costs. They 
want more police protection, better 
schools, smoother streets and prettier 
parks-and they want lower taxes. 
They want more service for less 
money-both at the same time. Be-
cause payroll costs make up 60% to 
70% of a normal city's operating costs, 
there is always pressure to get more 
work out of public employees and to 
pay them lower salaries. That is where 
the service/tax combination pinches 
most. When public employees strike, 
they strike against those who demand 
the services and who pay the wages. 
The second fundamental principle to 
be recognized is that the determination 
of terms and conditions of employment 
for public employees is a political deci-
sion. Economic forces, including the 
labor market, influence those who 
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make the decisions. The questions of 
how many shall be hired, what tasks 
they shall be assigned, and what they 
shall be paid, are ultimately made 
through the political process, par-
ticularly through the budgeting and 
taxing process. That process is politi-
cally answerable to those who use the 
services and pay the taxes. 
The function of a strike by public 
employees is to influence the outcome 
of the political process. It is to induce 
the employers-the taxpayers and the 
users of public services-to be willing 
to pay more to their employees than 
they might otherwise pay. It makes the 
costs of the union's demands more 
politically acceptable by making refusal 
of those demands more politically 
unacceptable. 
The instructive reaction to this per-
spective is to label a strike by employ-
ees a "political strike" and, by at-
taching such a label, to cease all fur-
ther thought. This, however, is but the 
beginning of inquiry. The question still 
remains-if we are to be slaves to 
semantics-Is it appropriate for 
economic pressure to be used in the 
making of this particular class of 
political decisions? 
I would remind you that economic 
considerations and, indeed, economic 
pressures enter into many political 
decisions. Businesses often bargain 
with city officials for tax concessions or 
other benefits in return for the promise 
to locate or remain situated in a city. 
Zoning decisions are shaped, if not 
dictated, by economic pressures as 
are a wide range of taxing and bud-
geting decisions. Economic pressure is 
no foreigner to the political process, 
and few pressures are as forthright and 
visible as the strike. 
Also, no one questions that public 
employees can individually withhold 
their services if the terms of employ-
ment are not acceptable-the 13th 
Amendment guarantees that right. Our 
intuitive labelling of strikes by public 
employees as political strikes is a 
response to our fear of concerted ac-
tion. But I would remind you that such 
concerted action directed toward in-
fluencing decisions of private 
employers was once considered an 
intolerable interference with market 
processes. Now the concerted action 
of the strike is permitted as an excep-
tion to the legally required " normal" 
market process of open competition. 
With this lesson from history, we should 
hold open the question of whether con-
certed economic action is appropriate 
for influencing decisions in public 
employment. Our intuitive fear of con-
certed economic action influencing 
political decisions may have healthy 
roots. I believe that it does, but there 
still may be room for an exception per-
mitting public employees to withhold 
their services in order to influence the 
political decisions of their employer 
as to their terms and conditions of 
employment. 
It is worth noting that public sector 
strikes have a certain directness of 
confrontation which, in schematic 
terms, gives them a special rationality 
and appropriateness not found in 
private sector strikes. When publ ic 
employees strike, they confront their 
employers-the taxpayers and users-
directly with the declaration, "You will 
not have our services until you meet 
our demands. " The taxpayers and 
users can respond, "We would rather 
do without. ' ' Not only is the confronta-
tion direct, but the costs of settlement 
are direct. The decision is controlled by 
those whose services are involved and 
who ultimately pay for the settlement. 
Contrast this with the private sector 
strike. If steelworkers strike, the impact 
puts autoworkers out of work, but the 
autoworkers have no voice concerning 
the continuation of the strike or the set-
tlement. The settlement affects the 
price of steel , and the purchase of a 
car helps pay the price, but the con-
sumer has no voice in either the strike 
or its settlement. The decision is made 
by the United Steelworkers and the 
steel companies. If maritime workers 
strike, it is the shippers goods which 
do not get moved; but the shipper has 
no voice in the dispute. If the union 
and the shipping companies decide to 
settle, the cost of increased wages is 
borne by the shippers, those who buy 
the product, and the government 
which provides subsidies. None of 
these has a voice in the decision. But 
when teachers or garbage workers or 
any other public employees strike, the 
ones who bear the burden of the strike 
and who pay for the settlement are the 
users and taxpayers. They have the 
ultimate voice throughout the political 
process. There is schematically a direct 
confrontation of economic interest and 
participation by those affected in the 
decision-making. 
Public employee strikes do not 
always provide the perfect confronta-
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tion for those who bear the burden of 
the strike, pay the costs of settlement, 
and control the outcome. When school 
teachers strike, the primary burden is 
on the parents and the children; 
however, many of those who pay the 
teachers' salaries are taxpayers who 
may have no children in school. Even 
so, the confrontation is much more 
direct than in a strike of steelworkers, 
longshoremen, truckdrivers or 
carpenters. 
The usefulness or propriety of public 
employee strikes, however, cannot be 
judged simply by the elegance with 
which it matches opposing interests 
and allows each side to weigh the 
costs of continued conflict against the 
costs of settlement. The crucial ques-
tion is whether the decisions to terms 
and conditions of employment should 
be influenced by the pressure brought 
on by a strike, or whether they should 
be determined free from those pres-
. sures. As citizens, users and taxpayers, 
we would of course like to be able to 
decide free from such pressures. Like 
all employers, we would like not to be 
subject to economic pressure. We 
might persuade ourselves to pay more 
because it is painful not to pay more, 
and we do not want to bear the pain. 
The case of the argument against 
public employee strikes is that public 
employees have sufficient political influ-
ence to protect their interests without 
the strike, and the strike then gives 
them too much political power. The 
assumptions behind this argument 
need to be examined. When public 
employees have no right to strike, the 
decision as to their terms and condi-
tions of employment gets made 
through the normal political process. 
In this process, however, public em-
ployees are a distinct minority, and 
those arrayed against the public em-
ployees are those who want the serv-
ices and do not want to pay the taxes. 
Politically, public employees are al-
ways outnumbered. To be sure public 
employee unions are often highly 
effective political organizations, but the 
fact remains that what the public em-
ployee gains must be paid for either in 
reduced services or increased taxes. 
The people who pay always have the 
largest potential political voice. It is 
commonplace that collective agree-
ments negotiated by political officials 
are rejected by voters, and tax in-
creases to pay for wage increases trig-
ger taxpayer revolts. In thousands of 
school districts, collective agreements 
or the money to fund them are voted 
down by voters in the districts. 
There was a time when this was 
not the case. Officials acted as if tax 
resources were unlimited, and that illu-
sion continued in some cities consider-
ably past the time when reality was 
apparent. But, in the last ten years, 
the pressures of tax burdens and the 
prevalence of taxpayer revolts have 
meant that public employees have had 
great difficulty bringing adequate 
political pressures through the normal 
processes to protect their interests. 
They simply do not have the votes. 
The strike obviously increases the 
political influence of public employees, 
but it is easy to overestimate the effec-
tiveness of a strike. We can readily 
conjure images of a strike closing 
down a city or a segment of govern-
ment; as a result, political resistance to 
the union's demands will collapse and 
politicians will sign an agreement 
leading to fiscal disaster. I would be 
the last to deny that this can and some-
times does happen, but it need not 
and normally does not happen since 
most public employee strikes are 
singularly ineffective. 
What is the impact and effectiveness 
of strikes by public employees? In the 
first place, we can live without most 
public services for a substantial period 
of time without serious consequences. 
Some few functions such as police and 
fire protection are obvious exceptions. 
But if teachers go on strike at the 
beginning of the school year, what are 
the consequences? For parents, the 
consequences are that they must take 
care of their children for another month 
-September is like August. For the 
children, September is also like Aug-
ust, but the time lost is made up by 
rescheduling classes. Vacations and 
holidays are shortened or eliminated 
and school continues on into June until 
the required number of class days 
have been provided. The effect of the 
strike is simply to shift the scheduling 
of the school year, unless the strike 
continues for more than a month or six 
weeks. There are costs and disloca-
tions caused by the changed schedul-
ing, but those are easy to exaggerate. 
If the public works employees 
responsible for repairing streets strike, 
we ride over the same potholes for a 
few more weeks. (Holes which have 
been there since February will get 
repaired in September instead of 
August.) If the parks employees strike, 
in some cities there would be no 
noticeable difference; and if the city 
hall employees strike, most people 
would not even know it. To be sure, 
public employee strikes have costs 
and inconveniences to the public, but 
they seldom place intolerable pressure 
on the public to settle at any price. 
On the employees' side, a strike 
causes them to lose all of their wages. 
Their incomes are cut off and few can 
get outside jobs to help make up for 
their lost incomes. When the strike is 
over, public employees seldom receive 
a lot of overtime pay to work off the 
accumulated backlog, which is unlikely 
to occur in many private sector strikes. 
For public employees, the strike means 
a total loss of earnings. At the same 
time, the city continues to collect taxes, 
its income is not interrupted, and it col-
lects for services not remedied. In-
deed, it is not unknown for public of-
ficials to secretly welcome a strike as a 
device for balancing the budget. Some 
teachers unions have learned this pain-
ful lesson when they strike in a school 
district facing budget problems. In 
public employee strikes, there may be 
pleasure rather than pain for the 
employer at the tax and budget level. 
This is, of course, directly contrary to 
the consequences of private sector 
strikes. The private employer loses pro-
duction, loses sales, and may per-
manently lose customers. In sum, a 
strike by public employees, on the 
whole, is less effective than a strike by 
private employees. 
The crucial question is whether the 
political process is capable of resisting 
the limited pressure exerted by a strike. 
What is the political position of public 
officials who negotiate and approve the 
settlements? If public officials embra e 
and cultivate the fear that a strike will 
cause the city to collapse or that 
children will grow up unschooled, then 
they can create a real or imaginary 
public panic. This panic situation will 
justify their signing a costly contract 
which is beyond the necessities of the 
situation or the fiscal capacity of the 
city or school district. But public of-
ficials have another alternative by mak-
ing clear to the public what is ultimately 
at stake-their public services and their 
taxes. They can say, " The union 's 
demands will require reducing gar-
bage collection from once-a-week to 
once every two weeks, " or " Giving in 
to the union will mean a six mill in-
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crease in taxes.'' When the voters see 
that the union's demands will cost 
them money, they may be willing or 
even anxious to endure the incon-
veniences of a strike. 
If public officials possess the wit and 
the will to make use of the potential 
political resource interest in the situa-
tion-that public employees are greatly 
outnumbered at the polls-then the 
political pressures of strikes can be 
resisted. The danger that public 
employee strikes will lead to over-
generous contracts comes at least half 
from dimwitted public officials who 
cannot or will not see their obvious 
political strengths. The remaining half 
of the danger comes from public of-
ficials who do not want to resist the 
strike. They want the sense of panic 
because they want the public to sur-
render. The union is thereby pacified 
and the public feels relieved that it 
escaped disaster. All that is needed in 
order to deal with public employee 
strikes is responsible public officials 
and voters who will hold the public 
employees politically responsible for 
their settlements. If we must choose 
between having public employees in 
the politically weak position of having 
to resort only to the normal political 
channels or allowing them to strike in 
order to exert added pressure in the 
political process, then I would prefer 
the latter. 
There is, of course, a third alternative 
-arbitration. This is the method used 
in Pennsylvania and in some other 
states for resolving disputes with police 
and fire department employees. Arbi-
tration has an immediate appeal 
because it is seen as providing a fair 
result without disruption of public serv-
ices. However, we ought not be too 
easily seduced for arbitration has cer-
tain questionable characteristics. First, 
arbitration is wrong in principle 
because the decisions to be made are 
political decisions which involve 
political values. Those decisions should 
be made through the political process. 
Arbitration often delegates the authority 
to make decisions to one who has 
neither political responsibility nor 
political sensitivity. Further, arbitration 
is wrong in principle because it 
enables those public officials who 
should have the authority and be 
politically responsible, to get " off the 
hook." They refuse to take responsibil-
ity for making an agreement and push 
the decision off to an arbitrator. When 
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the arbitrator grants a wage increase, 
the public officials disown any respon-
sibility for the resulting tax increase, 
proclaim that they are powerless and, 
thus, rest the blame on the arbitrator. 
Arbitration, in my opinion, is an escape 
mechanism for timid and irresponsible 
public officials. 
Second, arbitration carries the poten-
tial for political fraud on the public. It is 
not unknown for public officials, who 
should be making the decisions and 
bearing the political responsibility, to let 
the arbitrator know by direct or indirect 
means that they are willing to accept 
more than they offered at the bargain-
ing table. Through arbitration, elected 
officials may in fact give benefits to the 
union-sometimes for a political quid 
pro quo-while proclaiming to the 
public that it is all the arbitrator's fault. 
This danger is plainly visible in Penn-
sylvania's arbitration of police and fire 
department disputes. It is common-
place that, in these proceedings, the 
city's member on the three-member ar-
bitration board indicates subtly or 
openly that an award substantially 
above the city's offer will be accepted. 
The " neutral " arbitrator is not likely to 
insist that the award be for less and 
may accept that the city's arbitrator will 
file a dissent so that the city officials 
can disclaim all responsibility. 
Third, the arbitrators who make the 
decisions may have limited competence 
to deal with the problems involved. 
Decisions as to public employee 
wages and benefits involve fundamen-
tal tax and budget problems. Those 
decisions are more closely connected 
with city finance than with labor rela-
tions, and they involve considerations 
totally foreign to collective bargaining 
in the private sector. The expertise of 
many of the arbitrators, however, is in 
private sector labor relations not in 
public finance. Many have no knowl-
edge of the complexity of taxing struc-
tures or of the difficulty of comparing 
tax burdens. They are unable to 
penetrate even the most superficial 
disguises of hidden funds in a munici-
pal or school district budget, and are 
being asked to make decisions which 
have components beyond their 
com prehension. 
Fourth , even when the arbitrators 
are competent, they may not be given 
the information necessary to make a 
responsible decision. The experience 
in police and fire arbitration is that the 
parties seldom provide more than the 
most sketchy and meaningless fiscal 
data. The arbitrator can do little more 
than make an uninformed guess, or 
split the difference between what the 
other two arbitrators indicate is accept-
able. The arbitrator's lack of informed 
judgment is concealed by his not 
writing an opinion justifying the award. 
Arbitration of limited sectors such as 
police and fire is tolerable and is prob-
ably preferable to the other two alter-
natives. By comparing wage levels or 
wage increases in a particular case 
with those of police and fire depart-
ments in other cities, arbitrators do 
have some guidelines. This may result 
in a boot-strap process of arbitrators 
relying on awards of other arbitrators 
and may lead to the spiralling of wages 
for these two categories of employees. 
Arbitrators may also use as a guide the 
wage levels or wage increases of other 
employees in the same city. If these 
wages are established by collective 
bargaining within the political process, 
then arbitration of police and fire may 
reflect political decision-making. If the 
police demand 15% and other city 
employees have obtained only 5%, the 
arbitrator can recognize that what the 
police demand is out of line. The politi-
cal process can provide a guide for ar-
bitration, but if arbitration is relied on 
generally or for a dominant sector of 
employees, it has no such guide but 
instead establishes the pattern for a// 
public employees. The political proc-
ess is thereby totally displaced or is 
seriously distorted by arbitration. 
Despite its superficial , seductive ap-
peal , arbitration seems to me the least 
attractive alternative for determining 
public employees' terms and condi-
tions of employment. It is at most 
suitable for resolving disputes in those 
sectors where strikes are genuinely in-
tolerable. Although strikes in other sec-
tors have costs and inconveniences 
which should be avoided we, as em-
ployers-users of services and tax-
payers-might like to be able to dictate 
the terms of our employees , free from 
the pressures of the strike. But it seems 
to me that fairness to our employees 
requires that they be allowed to use 
the limited effectiveness of the strike to 
protect their interests. As taxpayers 
and users of public services, we want 
more services for less money. We have 
the overwhelming majority at the polls. 
Our employees need the strike as a 
countervailing measure in the political 
process. 
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The Insanity Plea: A Modern Dilemma 
Editor's Note: The following articles have been adapted 
from lectures delivered by Dr. Richard G. Lonsdorf, Dr. 
Robert L. Sadoff, and Professor Louis B. Schwartz at the 
Noyes Memorial Conference on November 4, 1982, 
Norristown State Hospital, Norristown, PA. 
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The Insanity Plea: A Plea for Reason 
By Richard G. Lonsdorf, M.D. 
Editor's Note: 
Dr. Richard G. Lonsdorf is Professor of Psychiatry in 
Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School and 
Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Penn-
sylvania School of Medicine. He was President of the 
Mental Health Association of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
from 1977 until 1980 and continues to serve that organi-
zation as a member of the Board. He is, as well, a member 
of the Board of the Mental Health Association of Penn-
sylvania, is the immediate past-president of the Philadel-
phia Psychiatric Society and serves on the governing 
council of the Pennsylvania Psychiatric Society. Most 
recently Dr. Lonsdorf served as a commissioner on the 
National Commission on the Insanity Defense of the 
National Mental Health Association. 
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Before examining the background and history of the 
Insanity Plea, I want to comment on the current attacks 
which have been made on that defense and some of 
the proposals which have been put forth to alter or to 
abandon it. Let me state at the outset that I do not feel 
the insanity plea to be the most pressing problem at the 
interface between the criminal justice and the mental 
health systems today. Problems concerning compe-
tency to stand trial or sentencing or the delivery of 
proper physical and mental health care in our prisons 
are certainly more urgent in terms of the numbers of 
people affected, and they should command more of our 
attention. None of these problems, however, is an in-
triguing as the insanity controversy nor do they evoke 
the emotional response that is stirred by the plea and all 
of the philosophical and practical problems swirling 
about it. 
Each time a sensational trial takes place (as in the 
John Hinckley case) a great deal of writing, discussion 
and debate on the insanity plea surfaces, much of it 
shrill and short-sighted, some of it probing and pro· 
found, but a// of it questioning society 's ultimate social 
values and beliefs on this troubling issue. The insanity 
plea provokes a deep-felt sense of outrage in people 
who perceive this as another example of the failure of 
the criminal justice system either to provide justice in a 
proper fashion or to make society secure from people 
who mean to do harm. The ultimate questions the in· 
sanity plea addresses are who is to be held morally 
responsible and who is not, who is to be held blame-
worthy and who is not, and who truly has free will and 
who is so mentally deranged that he has none. ALL of 
these issues can be easily lost in the heat of the furor. 
There are many who question whether or not an in-
sanity plea is necessary, and many who feel that it 
should be abolished. I think not. The rationale for the 
plea and the notion that there are people so mentally 
deranged that they cannot be held morally blame-
worthy, lies deep within not only our Anglo-American 
system but within virtually every civilized system of law. 
To eliminate this concept would do an enormous dis· 
service to the laws which have been developed so ar· 
duously and carefully over centuries of time. 
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Criminal law must be based on the individual's being 
responsible for his actions. Violators of our laws are 
found to be guilty, which is another way of saying that 
the individual has committed not only the act of which 
he has been accused, but that he is morally responsible 
and thus blameworthy and thus punishable. To punish 
those who cannot be held morally responsible because 
of the extent of their mental derangement, would only 
undermine the moral integrity of the law. We uphold the 
rule and validate the law by acknowledging the 
exception. 
Today, however, there are many who feel that too 
often people are " getting off by copping a plea"-and 
the plea that they are copping is the insanity plea. In the 
past, those found not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity were 
maintained, often for their lifetimes, in institutions called 
hospitals for the criminally insane. Through this confine-
ment our sense of humaneness was indulged, and we 
were certain that the objects of our humanity would be 
confined for lengthy periods of time in places called 
hospitals, even though these hospitals were and are 
very difficult to distinguish from prisons. Once removed 
from society, these people were no longer the subjects 
of our concern or of our interest. 
All of this has changed and for a number of reasons. 
Certain courts, for example, have begun to take the 
"not guilty" aspect of the plea very seriously. To say 
that these people are " not guilty" means that they have 
been acquitted and, if this is the case, how are they dif-
ferent from other non-convicts whom we seek to commit 
to mental institutions? Shouldn't they be given equal 
due-process protections? How long should they be re-
tained in custody? How long may they be retained and 
under what conditions? The problem is clearly one of 
dispositions. What does one do with these people once 
they are found not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity? This is a 
complex problem which I will touch upon later. 
I want to get back to the current concern of whether 
those found not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity are being 
confined for too short a period of time. Sadly and inex-
plicably, statistics on the exact number of accused and 
indicted felons choosing to plead not-guilty-by-reason-
of-insanity and on the exact time of those eventually 
found not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity, are very difficult to 
obtain. There are only scattered reports. The states of 
Michigan and New York and cities like St. Louis and 
Louisville have some of the only fairly decent records 
available. If one looks only at the truly serious crimes 
(murder, rape, aggravated assault, kidnapping , etc.)-
about one of every 1 ,000 of those accused and indicted 
chooses to plead not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity. In 
roughly 25% of those cases, the plea is successful. In 
short, it is not quite accurate to say that the insanity plea 
is "as rare as a snakebite in Manhattan': It is not that 
rare-but it is certainly not frequent and even less fre-
quently is it successful. 
It is true that in recent years there has been an in-
crease in the number of persons pleading NGRI who 
are charged with less serio.us crimes. But it is not true 
that many people pleading NGRI are not seriously 
disturbed. One study indicates that almost 90% of those 
pleading NGRI are diagnosed as having very serious 
mental disorders of psychotic proportions with over half 
of these having a history of prior hospitalization for that 
disorder. 
Nor do most NGRI cases create the circus-like battle-
of-the-experts atmosphere which characterized the 
Hinckley trial. A far more typical scenario is for the 
defense to raise the issue of whether or not the accused 
is competent to stand trial. That person is then 
hospitalized and the hospital is asked to make an 
assessment of both competency and criminal respon-
sibility. In many instances, the report is accepted by 
both sides. The determination of NGRI is plea-
bargained far more often than it is determined by trial. 
Eighty per-cent of the findings of NGRI are plea-
bargained without any of the fanfare that occurred in 
more notorious cases like Hinckley or with the "Son -of -
Sam" murders. In most of these instances, the clinical 
finding of psychosis is decisive and determinative of the 
outcome accepted by the prosecution whose own ex-
perts may well be tell ing them the same things. 
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What happens to those people found NGRI? The 
statistics are shaky but the best evidence is that they 
spend roughly the same length of time in institutions as 
they would have spent in prison had they been found 
guilty as originally charged. Some evidence suggests 
that they may spend somewhat less time after the ver-
dict but, when the time spent in confinement before trial 
is also counted, the NGRI acquittees spend just about 
the same time confined as those found guilty as 
charged. 
It should again be emphasized that insanity is a legal 
concept, not a psychiatric one. This point needs em-
phasis. It must be understood hat psychosis and/or any 
other psychiatric diagnosis can never be equated with 
insanity. The legal determination ultimately made by a 
judge or jury is just that-a legal determination from 
which certain consequences will flow. To be convicted 
of most crimes two elements must be proved. It must be 
established not only that the person committed the act 
but also that he had the proper kind of mind-set mens 
rea before the accused can be convicted. For instance, 
over a period of centuries, we have distinguished four 
different levels of homicide: first-degree murder, 
second-degree murder, manslaughter, and negligent 
homicide. All of which have different mens reas, the 
necessary elements which must be proved by the state 
beyond a reasonable doubt if the accused is to be 
found guilty of the crime charged. Many of the pro-
posals that would do away with the insanity defense, 
most notably those raised by the Reagan Administra-
tion, would permit only a defense which negates the 
mens rea. 
But beyond a mens rea defense there are certain 
so-called affirmative defenses (self-defense, accident, 
duress, etc.)-which totally excuse the accused from 
responsibility for his acts, but only when very strict con-
ditions have been met. Whether insanity is an affirmative 
defense or whether it is simply a finding that negates 
the mens rea, has been a subject of considerable 
debate, discussion and argument for a long time. The 
importance of deciding which choice to make lies in 
whether the government or the defense carries the 
burden-of-proof. If it is not an affirmative defense but 
merely a negation of the mens rea, it becomes the 
government's obligation, once the issue has been 
raised, to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. That 
is exactly what happened with the Hinckley trial. The 
Hinckley jury did precisely what it was told . It was told 
that the government had the burden of proving beyond 
a reasonable doubt that Hinckley was not insane. The 
simple fact of the matter is that while everyone knew 
what Hinckley had done, the government did not meet 
its burden, and Hinckley was found not-guilty-by-
reason-of-insanity. If insanity was regarded as an affir-
mative defense and had Hinckley the burden-of-proof 
placed on him (as is true in about half of our states), 
there might have been a rather different outcome. 
Historically, the insanity plea goes back to early 
Hebraic, Roman and Greek Law which provided that 
certain classes of persons (deaf mutes, idiots, minors, 
etc.) were not held responsible or punishable for their 
actions. The sources of the modern Anglo-American 
system can be traced to the thirteenth century. In 1278 
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there was a case in which a man convicted of hanging 
his daughter was released in the custody of twelve men 
who were to keep him from harming himself or anyone 
else. The reason given for this result was that "he com-
mitted the act while suffering from madness' : Thus, 
more than seven centuries ago, there were circum-
stances in which society would not call people blame-
worthy even when it was abundantly clear that they had 
committed the act of which they were accused. The 
issue then became what had to be demonstrated in the 
trial. In 1582, the test was "if a man is a natural fool or a 
lunatic in the time of his lunacy or a child who appar-
ently has no knowledge of good or evil doth kill a man, 
this is no felonious act, for they cannot be said to have 
any understanding will." The 1724 test provided for 
exculpation if the defendant "doth not know what he is 
doing no more than a wilde beest': 
Lord Matthew Hale, the Chief Justice of the Court of 
the King's Bench, published a work in 1736 that ex-
plained the insanity defense as being rooted in the 
fundamental moral assumptions of the criminal law: 
"The consent of will is that which renders human ac-
tions either commendable or culpable. Where there is a 
total defect of the understanding, there is no free act of 
the will. The test, the best measure I can think of, is 
whether or not the accused hath yet ordinarily as great 
understanding as ordinarily a child of fourteen years 
hath." 
The most famous of these early cases was the 
McNaughton case which caused as great a public out-
rage and outcry as did the Hinckley case. McNaughton 
believed that the Tories of his native city compelled him 
to do certain things, were persecuting and prosecuting 
him, were following him and were making life very dif-
ficult for him. He felt that the only way out of his problem 
was to kill the leading Tory, Sir Robert Peale, the Prime 
Minister of Great Britain. McNaughton set out to kill Sir 
Robert but entered the wrong carriage and, in fact, 
killed Edward Drummond, Peale's secretary. The case 
attracted an enormous amount of attention and noto-
riety. Queen Victoria, who had been the subject of at 
least three assassination attempts (one of her would-be 
assassins was found not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity), 
was outraged when McNaughton was found NGRI. The 
Queen responded by summoning the House of Lords 
"to take the opinion of the judges on the law governing 
such cases.'' Fifteen judges of the common law courts 
were called in, an extraordinary session under a not-
too-subtle atmosphere of pressure. They produced the 
McNaughton's Rules, the same rules under which we 
still try insanity cases in Pennsylvania and in twenty 
other states. McNaughton's Rules state that the jury 
should be told that every person is presumed to be 
sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be 
responsible for his crimes until the contrary is proved to 
their satisfaction. Secondly, it must be clearly proven 
that, at the time of committing the act, the accused 
party was laboring under such a defect of reason from 
disease of the mind as not to know the nature and qual-
ity of the act he was doing; or, if he did know the nature 
and quality of the act, that he did not know that what he 
was doing was wrong. One can assume that this was 
meant to be a cognitive test and, while the law has 
20
Penn Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol18/iss1/1
never defined exactly what was meant by " know" or 
"defect of reason·~ or "nature and quality" or " right or 
wrong': most commentators believe that "know" was to 
be defined in the straightforward, simple, cognitive 
sense of the word. For example, if one knows that pull-
ing the trigger will cause the bullet to be projected 
which, if it hits someone will do that person harm, one 
has sufficient knowledge to fail the test. No sooner were 
the McNaughton Rules pronounced than they were in-
tensely attacked as being too strict and too narrow. Dr. 
Isaac Ray, the most famous forensic psychiatrist of the 
time, criticized them roundly stating that far more was 
known about behavior than could be testified to under 
the McNaughton Rules, and added that the mind does 
not operate in such highly restrictive narrow compart-
ments as the Rules implied. In order to meet such 
criticism, many American jurisdictions joined an "ir-
resistible impulse" addition to the Rules. This defense 
called for the jury to acquit the defendant if he could not 
control his conduct "even if a policeman were at his 
elbow." 
By far the most interesting experiment in devising a 
new test to substitute for the McNaughton Rules was 
done by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia 
in 1954 when Judge David Bazelon wrote the Durham 
decision. If any single theme can be said to have per-
vaded the Durham decision, it was that of encouraging 
the fullest possible range of psychiatric testimony. 
Judge Bazelon hoped to encourage the psychiatrist "to 
present the court and the jury with all of the information 
that could be provided to answer the question of why 
the defendant did this terrible thing ." The ultimate test 
was to be that an accused is not criminally responsible if 
his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or 
mental defect. What followed was an eighteen-year 
history of legal and psychiatric frustration as 
psychiatrists tried to fit their constructs and testimony 
into what they believed the law to be. The confusion 
was great in part because there never was clear under-
standing of how the two disparate disciplines were to 
mesh. Psychiatrists testified that persons suffered from 
mental disease using psychiatric standards and then at-
tempted to transfer these standards into what they 
thought the law meant when it used the words " mental 
disease': The courts assumed that the concept of men-
tal disease was a clearly-defined one to the psychiatrists 
and so they allowed such testimony. Both the court and 
the psychiatrists acted as though the concept of mental 
disease was well-understood and well-established-but 
by the other side. The first indication that the emperor 
had no clothes was revealed in a famous " weekend-
shift" decision. In 1957 on a Friday, a psychiatrist 
testified that a particular defendant was a sociopath- a 
person without mental disorder. Over the weekend, a 
conference was held by the psychiatrists at St. 
Elizabeth 's Hospital and the staff concluded that they 
had been testifying incorrectly and that sociopathy was 
indeed a mental disease. After all , the psychiatric 
diagnostic manual said that sociopathy was a mental 
disease. So the same patient, the same accused, the 
same psychiatrist and the same diagnosis which were 
declared no mental disease on Friday were declared 
mental disease on Monday. Lawyers were outraged. 
What eventually became obvious, however, was that 
the practice of a psychiatrist transferring his constructs 
into a totally different system really did not work well at 
all . Attempts to remedy this intolerable set of cir-
cumstances were tried , definitions were offered, the 
psychiatrists were told exactly how they should testify, 
but tinkering with the Durham decision did not correct 
the problem. Eventually, the same court overturned the 
Durham decision and joined every other Federal 
jurisdiction (and over half the rest of the states) in em-
bracing the All standard. 
The American Law Institute produced its insanity 
defense rule in draft form in 1954 and finally adopted it 
in 1961 . As adopted in the District of Columbia to 
replace the Durham rule, the All standard states that " a 
person is not responsible for criminal conduct if, as a 
result of mental disease or defect, wt:lich is defined as 
an abnormal condition of the mind which substantially 
affects mental or emotional processes and impairs 
behavioral controls, all of which have to be present at 
the time of the conduct, he lacks substantial capacity 
either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or 
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." The 
All standard obviously transcends the relatively restric-
tive cognitive test found in McNaughton and rather em-
braces the notion of volitional control as well. When the 
combination of the All Rule in the District of Columbia 
and the placing of the burden-of-proof on the govern-
ment to prove non-insanity beyond a reasonable doubt 
came together and produced the Hinckley decision, the 
public and many legislators were outraged and de-
manded an immediate and final solution to the problem. 
There have been many suggestions as to how the 
problem should be solved. First, there is the suggestion 
that the insanity plea be abolished altogether. The 
states of Idaho and Montana have done so already. 
Second, there is the suggestion that the verdict should 
be changed and reworded from " not-guilty-by-reason-
of-insanity'' to ' 'not-criminally-responsible-by-reason-of-
insanity" thereby clarifying exactly what an insanity 
decision means and, thus, hopefully relieving the public 
of its sense of fear that one can commit a serious crime 
and get away with it. Third, the burden-of-proof might 
be shifted from the government to the defense-
perhaps by using " clear and convincing " as the stand-
ard of proof and thus making the defendant's task 
somewhat more difficult while, at the same time, reliev-
ing the government of the all but impossible task of 
proving someone not insane beyond anyone's reason-
able doubt. Fourth , the expert might be prevented from 
testifying in ultimate terms. In other words, allow the 
psychiatrists and psychologists to discuss schizo-
phrenia, neurosis, psychopathy-any diagnosis in their 
diagnostic manual-allow them to draw legal conclu-
sions and, especially, do not allow them to testify as to 
their opinions of the defendant's sanity. This remedy is 
accepted and encouraged by the American Psychiatric 
Association ' 'because it is clear that psychiatrists are 
experts in medicine, not the law." Fifth, one could 
eliminate the volitional aspects of the All and take a 
more strictly interpreted cognitive McNaughton ap-
proach . Sixth, an entirely new verdict could be adopted 
and added to those now available. One that is presently 
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popular (it has become law in eighf states including 
Pennsylvania) is the guilty-but-mentally-ill rule. There are 
many philosophical and practical objections to such a 
rule; these objections have proved conclusive enough 
that at least three major investigations of the insanity 
defense (those of the American Bar Association, the 
American Psychiatric Association and the National Men-
tal Health Association) caution against such an ap-
proach. Seventh, one might adopt a proposal best-
expressed in Senator Strom Thurmond's suggested rule 
that says "it shall be an affirmative defense only if the 
mental disease has destroyed entirely the ability to 
understand." This proposal, which has considerable 
support, would virtually destroy the insanity defense as 
we have come to know it-insisting, as it does, that a 
defendant would qualify for acquittal only if he thinks he 
is shooting at a tree when he is, in fact, shooting at 
another person, or when he thinks he is squeezing a 
lemon when, in fact , he is choking someone else. All of 
these proposals deserve far more time and far greater 
depth than can be given here. 
The largest pragmatic problem of all is that of disposi-
tion. What does one do with these people? Must we, 
under legislative criteria for civil commitment, release in-
dividuals because they have been found "not guilty '; 
and then be unable to hold them without a finding of 
present imminent danger to themselves or to others? 
Can we not determine that these people are different-
that they have, in the recent past, committed acts 
which, but for the acuteness and severity of their mental 
disorders, would have been serious enough to find 
them blameworthy and thus criminally responsible and 
thus punishable. Can we not erect different but constitu-
tionally permissible procedures that would allow us to 
hold these people in custody until they can demon-
strate, by clear and convincing evidence before a court 
of law, that they no longer pose a threat. 
As of 1980 there were twenty states which allowed 
persons found NGRI to be released to the community 
on the authority of the mental health system Without the 
necessity of a court hearing. Surely this is societal 
madness of some degree. It offers far too little process 
to protect the public and far too great a burden to be 
placed on mental health professionals. 
We cannot go back to the time when the key was 
thrown away. It must be recognized that there are peo-
ple who do improve and recover under good medical 
care in good hospitals. There does come a time when 
these unfortunate people do remit stably enough to per-
mit release. The time does come, however, when a risk 
must be taken and their liberty gradually must be 
restored. Surely it is not beyond us to devise plans 
which will both protect the civil rights of the NGRI ac-
quittee and, at the same time, satisfy the public that 
justice has been done and that their safety and their 
sensibilities have been given full account. 
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Psychiatrists are called upon by lawyers and judges 
to evaluate individuals in a number of different legal 
situations, both civil and criminal. Psychiatrists involve 
themselves in assessments of individuals and families 
with regard to custody battles in domestic relations 
cases, in commitment procedures, in personal injury ac-
tions, and in the evaluation of competency for various 
purposes. Psychiatrists may be called upon in criminal 
matters to assess the defendant's state of mind at any 
stage in the proceedings from the point of arrest until 
sentencing and, even afterward, for the evaluation of 
the individual with regard to parole or probation. 
Most of these assessments involve the evaluation 
of the state of mind at the time of the examination , i.e. 
present mental status. The forensic psychiatrist may 
then apply his medical findings to the legal situation at 
hand. Is the person mentally competent to stand trial? Is 
he or she competent to be sentenced? Is the individual 
disabled as a result of mental disorder? 
The role of the psychiatrist involved in insanity cases 
differs in that the assessment is for a state of mind at a 
time prior to the examination. The psychiatrist must then 
determine from all sources available what the defend-
ant's particular state of mind was at the time he or she 
became involved in a particular act. This is a very dif-
ficult assessment to conduct and may not be completed 
on the basis of a psychiatric examination or interview 
alone. That examination is necessary, but not sufficient. 
The forensic psychiatrist, assessing an individual 's state 
of mind at a prior time, must have access to all medical 
records, hospital reports, police reports and statements 
by others present at the time who can give valid obser-
vations of the defendant's behavior, attitude, com-
posure, and appearance at the time of the alleged of-
fense or as close to it as possible. Often the defendant 
is not a reliable informant and the psychiatrist must rely 
upon information or data collected from other sources. 
Often the defense attorney has an investigator who is 
able to collect this information and provide it for the 
psychiatrist and often the district attorney or prosecutor 
has access to other information that may be obtained 
through discovery procedures. 
When the forensic psychiatrist has the opportunity 
to conduct a thorough and complete examination in-
cluding interviews of family members, police officers 
and others, as well as multiple examinations of the 
defendant with the use of special testing when indi-
cated, such as neurologic examination, psychological 
testing, electroencephalogram, CAT scan, sodium 
amytal interview, he is in a better position to assess the 
state of mind of the defendant at the particular time of 
the alleged act. We know from newspaper accounts 
and interviews of psychiatrists involved in the Hinckley 
case that countless hours were spent evaluating outside 
materials and interviewing other individuals. In addition, 
multiple hours were spent with Mr. Hinckley. The psy-
chiatrists on both the defense and the prosecution 
teams conducted what appeared to be thorough and 
comprehensive evaluations, examinations and assess-
ments. Why then did these psychiatrists differ in their 
conclusions about Mr. Hinckley not only with regard to 
the ultimate question of insanity but also with respect to 
his diagnosis? The defense psychiatrists labeled Mr. 
Hinckley as schizophrenic or psychotic, therefore hav-
ing the requisite mental state necessary for insanity at 
the time that he shot the President and three other men. 
The psychiatrists for the prosecution , however, after 
their comprehensive evaluation, concluded that Mr. 
Hinckley was not suffering from schizophrenia but was 
labeled as having a number of personality disorders 
which were not far from "normal': They concluded that 
he was not, therefore, insane at the time of the shooting. 
The question has been asked and should be asked 
again: why did the psychiatrists called by the prosecu-
tion line up in the manner in which they did, and why 
did the psychiatrists for the defense see Mr. Hinckley in 
a different light? They all had access to the same 
material, to the same individual and, presumably, to the 
same skills at interviewing, evaluating, assessing and 
collecting data. One does not know whether other psy-
chiatrists were called upon by the prosecution or the 
defense to assess Mr. Hinckley and, then, were not 
called to testify. It happens fairly frequently that a 
psychiatrist is called by the defense to examine a par-
ticular defendant and then tells the defense counsel that 
his client is not mentally ill or was not insane, in his 
opinion, at the time of the alleged criminal act. It is most 
unlikely that defense counsel would call that particular 
psychiatrist to testify at the trial because his testimony 
would not help his client; rather it would harm him if the 
insanity defense were to be raised. Conversely, if the 
prosecution has requested a psychiatric examination 
and their expert concludes that the defendant was men-
tally ill and fit the legal test of insanity in that jurisdiction, 
the prosecution is more likely to call the experts who 
conclude that the defendant was sane to the witness 
stand. This is a process of screening controlled by the 
attorneys, not by the psychiatrists. 
Another factor that enters into the final decision about 
the expert witness psychiatrist is the track record he or 
she may have in testifying in previous cases. Some 
psychiatrists are labeled as "prosecution-oriented" or 
"defense-oriented" and are called more frequently by 
the attorney whose case most closely fits the philosophy 
and orientation of the psychiatrist. If a psychiatrist ac-
quires a reputation among attorneys and judges as 
being either prosecution or defense-oriented, his 
credibility suffers since the court will be able to predict 
that psychiatrist's conclusions even before his assess-
ment begins. It may seem unfair to prejudge particular 
psychiatrists and even label them as "hired guns" but, 
in the real world of forensic psychiatry, this is exactly 
what occurs. Thus, it behooves the forensic psychiatrist 
who is interested in maintaining credibil ity with lawyers 
and judges, to remain as neutral in his orientation as 
possible and to be available for examination and assess 
ment for whichever side requests his professional serv-
ices. There are some attorneys, both in civil and criminal 
cases, who want an honest professional opinion and 
respect the psychiatrist whose conclusions may differ 
from their own needs and who can provide sufficient 
evidence or data to support their conclusions. This is 
helpful to the attorney since it aids in pointing out the 
weaknesses of his case, helps him to prepare his 
witnesses and, also, can prepare his cross-examination 
of the experts on the other side. 
Beyond philosophy lies the realm of hard reality and, 
beyond the Hinckley-type cases which are relatively 
rare " battles of the experts", lie the more usual insanity 
cases wherein the experts on both sides agree on the 
diagnosis and very often agree on the legal conclusions 21 
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of insanity or culpability. Many insanity cases are 
negotiated when the experts on both sides agree. 
These cases are not remarkable and rarely hit the head-
lines of our newspapers. It is in a case such as Hinckley 
and in those like it, where psychiatric experts differ and 
where public questions are raised about the validity and 
reliability of psychiatric diagnostic criteria and 
psychiatric testimony. 
It should be pointed out that psychiatrists have no 
formal training in the evaluation of a defendant for the 
insanity defense. The training consists of skills at inter-
viewing and diagnosing mentally ill people. The applica-
tion of the. medical findings to the legal test is an individ-
ualized, often subjective application which is not stand-
ardized and is most vulnerable to attack on cross-
examination. Even if the psychiatrists for defense and 
prosecution agree that the defendant is schizophrenic, 
they may disagree that he was insane. It is important to 
distinguish clearly, for the jury and for others, between 
mental illness and legal insanity. All psychotics are not 
insane and all individuals found to have been legally in-
sane at the time of a particular act may not have been 
psychotic. 
It should also be pointed out that there are differ-
ences in examining a defendant for defense counsel 
as opposed to examining for prosecution especially 
in Pennsylvania. The defendant likely will be more 
cooperative with his own attorney's consultant or expert 
than he will with the psychiatrist working for the District 
Attorney's Office. There are also more special tests that 
can be performed when working as a defense expert 
such as the use of sodium amytal, hypnosis or poly-
graph, in order to ascertain various data which may not 
be utilized by the psychiatrist consulting with the prose-
cution. On the other hand, the prosecution's psychiatrist 
has access to policy reports, police interviews and 
police investigation data long before it becomes avail-
able to the defense psychiatrist. In Pennsylvania, the 
prosecution psychiatrist may not conduct a complete 
psychiatric examination of the defendant if defense 
counsel prohibits it. Pennsylvania is one of the last re-
maining states that recognizes the defendant's right to 
protect against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment when interviewed by psychiatrists for the prosecu-
tion to whom they may give inculpating statements dur-
ing the examination. In some cases, the defendant has 
been ordered by the court to appear for examination by 
the prosecution psychiatrist but has been allowed not to 
answer questions he/she does not wish to answer. 
These distinctions highlight the difference between 
the general psychiatrist and the forensic psychiatrist 
working in insanity cases. The general psychiatrist treats 
mentally ill people. These are people who need help 
and come to the psychiatrist because they are in emo-
tional pain and want to be relieved of their distress. 
They are likely to be coopertive, honest and open with 
their treating psychiatrists. On the other hand, the for-
ensic psychiatrist is not a treating psychiatrist but an 
evaluator. Defendants do not come to him because 
they are hurting, but because someone else has re-
quested the evaluation. They are not likely to be as 
open or as honest with the examining psychiatrist. Thus, 
it is necessary for the forensic psychiatrist to utilize 
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special skills in his interviewing techniques to obtain suf-
ficient, valid information in order to make reliable and 
valid conclusions. How does the forensic psychiatrist 
know if his patient is being honest with him and if what 
the patient is saying is true? The psychiatrist does not 
always know and that is why outside sources of verifica-
tion must be utilized rather than taking the defendant's 
word for it. For example, the defendant will tell the 
psychiatrist that he does not remember what has hap-
pened at the time of the alleged offense. Very often, 
rather than reflecting a true amnesia, such statements 
are self-serving and reflect the defendant's wish for the 
psychiatrist not to know. In such an instance, without 
entering the issue of guilt or innocence, I may use a 
polygraph just to determine whether the defendant is 
lying about not remembering. 
Ethics in forensic psychiatry are developing but are 
not yet standardized. There are differences between the 
examining psychiatrist and the treating psychiatrist. The 
treating psychiatrist always represents his patient or is 
the agent of his patient when treating him. The forensic 
psychiatrist, on the other hand, always represents the 
person who calls him for consultation. This may be 
defense counsel, prosecutor or judge. During the 
assessment and evaulation phase, the forensic psychia-
trist must recognize to whom he owes allegiance in the 
event of an apparent conflict. For example, suppose the 
defendant tells the defense psychiatrist information he 
does not wish that psychiatrist to pass on to his lawyer. 
The psychiatrist may feel that this information is im-
portant and cannot promise the defendant that he will 
not reveal it to his attorney who is there to help him 
legally. 
When conducting an examination for the District 
Attorney's Office, the psychiatrist must alert the defend-
ant of his role, explaining whom he represents, what he 
will do with the information he collects, and how this in-
formation will affect the defendant. These are the so-
called " psychiatric Miranda warnings" that psychiatrists 
must present to defendants and other individuals who 
are examined during forensic situations. In my opinion, 
it is not ethical for a psychiatrist to conduct an examina-
tion without first explaining to the person being 
examined about the procedure and how it will affect 
him or her. 
Another ethical issue in criminal assessments revolves 
around the question of whether a prosecution psychia-
trist may examine a defendant before the defendant is 
represented by counsel. In my opinion, it would be 
unethical for a psychiatrist representing the prosecution 
to obtain information that may be harmful to the patient 
before the defendant has an opportunity to discuss the 
examination with his attorney and prepare for the ex-
amination. The psychiatrist working for the prosecution, 
after all, is not there to trick the defendant or trap him or 
her into giving inculpatory statements that may be ob-
tained in a more legitimate fashion. 
Recently, following the Hinckley case, there has been 
a hue and cry to modify the insanity defense or to 
eliminate it. After much emotional pressure, cooler 
heads have prevailed and the recommendations by 
both the American Bar Association and the American 
Psychiatric Association have retained the insanity 
defense and both have recommended to eliminate the 
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volitional aspect of insanity. This exists in the American 
Law Institute Model Penal Code wherein the defendant 
has lacked "substantial capacity to conform his conduct 
to the requirements of the law· : Many have argued that 
psychiatrists cannot predict such behavioral or volitional 
matters and should stay with the cognitive concept of 
wrongfulness of the act, which exists in the other arm of 
the All test and in the McNaughton test for insanity. 
In my opinion it really does not matter what test is 
used if the jury is sympathetic with the defendant. In-
sanity is a means of exculpation for a number of 
reasons. The defense of insanity is designed to give the 
jury a means of exculpating the defendant. There are a 
number of cases in which insanity was pled for that 
reason and the jury responded accordingly. Some 
related to euthanasia and others to criminal behavior 
which was questionable in the eyes of the jury. 
A word about testimony in insanity cases. Prior to 
court appearance, the expert is the agent of the side 
that calls him. On the witness stand, the expert is the 
agent of the court and must not become an adversary 
witness. He may advocate his point of view and his 
opinion, but must recognize that any psychiatric 
testimony can be effectively attacked by good cross-
examination. His role, in my opinion, is to teach rather 
than to advocate. He is called as an expert because he 
has training and experience beyond that of the average 
intelligent lay-person. 
I support the adversary system and would not want a 
jury of psychiatrists to determine insanity. There are too 
many differences and too many pressures within the 
profession. The psychiatrist going into court must learn 
to play by the rules of the game and must not use the 
forum of the courtroom to advocate changes of 
substance. 
Finally, what is to be done with a person who is found 
not-guilty-by-reason-of-insanity? The major criticism 
following Hinckley was that persons found NGRI would 
get out early and would terrorize the community. 
Statistics have shown that this is not the case and that 
those found NGRI may be confined longer than those 
convicted of comparable crimes. There are two models 
that have been recommended for treating the person 
found NGRI. One is the Oregon Committee which 
follows the individual through the hospital and into the 
community. Decisions are made by a committee com-
posed of psychiatrists, lawyers and parole officers. The 
other model, employed in the state of New Jersey, is 
that of the gradual release from maximum security con-
finement to the community after careful consideration 
following a hearing by the court. 
The role of the psychiatrist in insanity cases is a com-
plex one and should not be taken lightly and should not 
be undertaken by the inexperienced psychiatrist. Those 
psychiatrists who wish to work in this field should obtain 
training and experience through fellowship programs, 
through involvement in courses at the APA and the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, and 
then should strive for certification by the American 
Board of Forensic Psychiatry. This Board is a certifying 
organization which promotes excellence in the field. If 
we continue to conscientiously upgrade the quality of 
our care, we will continue to improve our consultation to 
the legal system which requires our services. 
The Insanity Plea: 
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I want to place the problem of the insanity plea in 
proportion. Actually, it is a peripheral problem of law en-
forcement and public security today. The plea is not 
entered often, few people succeed when it is entered 
and, if one does succeed with the plea, the alternative 
sentence to a mental hospital is very tough. Hence the 
question is raised: Why does the subject of the insanity 
plea rouse such passion? To me the answer is that there 
is something wrong with the press or, if there is such a 
thing , with the public's psyche. Psychiatrists ought to be 
throwing some light on why so much relative attention is 
given to a phenomenon that is related so little to the 
security of the general public .. There are few people 
who escape and fewer who can count on escaping. 
The plea has nothing whatsoever to do with the main 
purpose of the criminal law system, which is based on 
deterrence primarily, in order to make some people 
behave more in conformity with generally accepted 
norms. 
I would like particularly to discuss the goals of the 
criminal law since they are so distinct from the goals of 
therapy. Therapy, if the word has any meaning, is an ef-
fort to help the person in need of psychiatric treatment; 
the criminal law sometimes is said to include the aim of 
rehabilitation for those who have gone astray. We live, 
however, in an era of considerable skepticism about the 
ability to achieve such a rehabilitative goal under the cir-
cumstances of prisons or juvenile detention facilities. 
Another goal which does throw light on this passion-
this public press hysteria on the subject of insanity as a 
defense -is retribution . I speak respectfully of the goal 
of retribution in criminal law. It was, for a long time, quite 
disrespected. More recently, " an eye for an eye and a 
tooth for a tooth " has been recognized as a taming of 
that basic and pervasive retributive instinct which could 
claim lives for relatively minimal offenses. Ages ago, 
forms of torture were devised, like boiling in oil , brand-
ing, chopping off limbs, etc.-in order to vindicate either 
the retributive or the deterrent goal. Against this 
background, a measured retribution- " an eye for an 
eye" -was an ameliorative reform in the criminal law. It 
still serves the function of maintaining a certain propor-
tionality between what was done by the criminal and 
what is about to be done to him or to her. I do not wish 
to sponsor the notion that we are entitled to be as 
violent to the criminal as the criminal was to his victim. 
We are or pretend to be better people than the 
accused. We are deliberately and, as a social body, 
choosing instruments that are harsh at best to serve 
social goals, and we would like to minimize suffering, 
even the suffering of those who have violated our 
norms. 
There is another goal posited for the penal law and 
that is incapacitation. That goal is hardly impaired by 
any regime that is adopted for the defense of insanity. 
There is going to be incapacitation of people found to 
be dangerous by the civil commitment route or by the 
prison route. I cannot generate a passion in myself 
about the decision of which route to go because there 
are so few cases which have surfaced in which the in-
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sanity defense has been raised. I feel that one of the im-
portant penal code goals is that everyone be tried 
fairly-that they be tried by the same laws, and that the 
potentials of their convictions and acquittals be fairly 
well-described so that the matter is not left at-large to 
juries or even, for that matter, to judges. The idea that 
people are tried by general norms in our society has a 
few consequences. One is that there is not a special 
status for psychiatrists, who are often outraged that they 
have to bring their expertise to bear in very strange 
situations in which cross-examination often unfairly 
makes them appear like fools. They are often con-
fronted with colleagues who have opposing opinions, 
some of whom have not examined the defendant. It is 
true that there have been excesses in cross-examining 
and other treatment of psychiatric testimony. It is not 
true, however, that psychiatrists for that reason should 
be exempt from cross-examination or be exempt from 
explaining their assessment of human beings, although 
it may be a complicated and esoteric explanation. Nor 
should we toy with the idea of abandoning the jury 
system. There are many experts who might say, " What 
do those twelve dumb jurors know about this? ': especi-
ally when the jurors have been confused by the con-
frontations of psychiatrists possessing the same de-
grees and the same qualifications. There are experts in 
metallurgy who testify on airplane accidents; there are 
experts in pathology who testify to the cause of death 
and have differences of expert opinion in that area; 
there are engineers who testify that the design of the 
automobile was or was not as safe as could reasonably 
be expected. So I do urge that psychiatric testimony not 
be looked upon as an unique conflict of law and exper-
tise in a related profession, but as an unavoidable cir-
cumstance of a legal system. 
I would like to address some alternative rules of 
responsibility besides the McNaughton Rule and the 
All Rule. Two proposals were laid before the American 
Law Institute and illustrate how unavoidably inconclu-
sive any of the rules have been. The first of them was 
advanced by my colleague and co-reporter on the 
Model Penal Code and went as follows: psychiatric 
testimony should not be constrained by McNaughton 's 
Rules, or should not be limited to the question of 
whether the defendant utimately knew what he/she was 
doing and knew that it was wrong, but should fully 
describe the situation or the state of mind at the time of 
the act as well as it could be reconstructed. Then, ac-
cording to this criterion , the jury would be told to convict 
the accused if it seemed " just" to do so. Although that 
rule was advanced by a very able, discerning, sensitive 
man, I opposed it. What might be thought of as " just" 
by a jury-twelve different people chosen ad hoc-
would be a function of their particular sensitivities and, 
more especially, their view of the horror of the crime. In 
other words, if the crime were bad enough, many jurors 
would say, " I don 't care how crazy he was, he ought to 
go to jail for this': Psychiatrists, on the other hand, might 
well regard the very aggravating circumstances of the 
crime as a symptom of the inability to control. 
There is another perhaps more subtle, law-related 
point. In the structure of the court and jury in our legal 
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system, the jury has the final word but the court tells 
them the rules of the game. Although juries are not con-
trolled, that is about as far as we can go to regularize 
the matter. Some jurors do disregard charges; however, 
I think that more often than not they take seriously what 
the judges tell them . Therefore, I see it as a total 
abrogation of the legal system to throw up our hands 
and tell the jury to convict the accused if it thinks convic-
tion is "just' : The law exists to guide juries in determin-
ing when it is just or unjust. Although I disapprove of 
this rule, there are very good people in the legal 
universe who think it the correct way to handle the 
problem. 
There are also many good people who think that the 
repeal of the insanity defense is the right way, although I 
do not. I do not because I relate guilt and culpability. If 
someone is indeed seriously ill , I concede that the func-
tion of the criminal law should not be to threaten that 
person or other persons in similar situations. In other 
words, if we are attempting to deter people by means 
of the criminal justice system, then it should be recog-
nized that some people are sufficiently ill as to be unde-
terrable, i.e. beyond the reach of that system. It does 
not make sense to put such people on the criminal law 
track; rather they should be put on the hospital track. 
Secondly, insofar as the criminal justice system is 
retributive, we all know that the feeling of retribution 
against someone who is obviously ill is ordinarily less. 
Retributive feelings are diminished for persons who are 
very young , for persons whose circumstances tend to 
lead them to commit crime and, also, for persons who 
are seriously mentally ill. The retributive impulse in these 
cases is lessened, and there is no reason not to give in 
to the impulse of mercy-the correlative of retribution-
when the effect upon the deterrent force of the system 
is absolutely unimpaired. The generality of those who 
commit crimes is not going to be encouraged (unless 
by the crazy press), by the occasional acquittal of a 
Joey Coyle or a Hinckley, to steal lost articles or to 
shoot a President. 
Again , in an effort to put this debate into proportion, 
here is another alternative test to the McNaughton and 
the All Rules which I advanced some time ago but 
which failed to pass. (The All Test was adopted in-
stead.) Under my proposal , the accused would be ex-
amined by a psychiatrist to determine whether other 
persons exhibiting his symptoms are substantially 
undeterrable. If they are considered undeterrable, then 
it would be inappropriate to include such people on the 
criminal law track. On the other hand if they seem deter-
rable, despite their illness, then they should be placed in 
the criminal law track. I have realistically accepted the 
fact that nearly everyone is sick. Some people are con-
tinually washing their hands after contact with a door 
knob, others do not go under ladders, some individuals 
at the Law School express themselves by stabbing 
paintings in the halls, some write graffitti in the 
lavatories, etc. Actually, I regard illness as virtually 
100%
. I 
also regard criminality as 100%, having never 
spoken to an adult who had not done that for which the 
penal code prescribed jail. One has either cheated on 
taxes or brought objects across borders without paying 
customs fees or driven recklessly or tried some cocaine. 
One could run down the list and convict everyone! It is 
not a " we-they" proposition. 
What finally do I have to offer in the way of a pro-
gram? At my age, a little improvement is all that I ex-
pect. First of all, if we had good judges, we would not 
have had the ridiculous spectacle which took place with 
the Hinckley Trial. The eight psychiatrists-four experts 
testifying on each side-only fed the general insecurity 
with the notion that such trials are a rich man 's game. It 
is quite well-settled that a judge has the discretion to 
limit cumulative testimony and, clearly, in the pre-trial 
conference, the judge could have limited the psychiatric 
testimony to one on each side. Secondly, the right of 
the psychiatrist to examine the accused should be 
established. The use of hypothetical questions, which 
can confuse any expert and certainly could confuse any 
jury, must be limited. The law should permit a judge to 
instruct the jury that testimony by a properly qualified 
psychiatrist should be given more weight than " lay 
testimony" about the superficially " normal " behavior 
of the accused. I am not suggesting that lay people 
who witnessed a defendant immediately at the time of 
his/her act be barred from testifying . Hearing testimony 
describing a defendant's behavior and appearance is 
useful data and should not be excluded . I do think, 
however, that to equate the testimony of professionals 
with that of a lay person only misleads a jury. Further-
more, there should be constraints on the release from 
custody of people committed on the grounds of insan-
ity; both the district attorney and the trial judge should 
participate in that decision. It is much too easy to 
discharge a person from a hospital because all of the 
beds are occupied and because more people are 
being admitted than are being released. 
Finally something could be done to shift the burden-
of-proof on the issue of insanity. Although criminal law 
properly requires the state to prove every element of the 
offense " beyond reasonable doubt'; I do not feel as 
strongly about the defense of insanity as I do about 
other elements like- did the defendant purposely take 
life? That clearly goes to culpability. I see the defense of 
insanity not so much as an element of the offense as a 
delineation of the limits of the criminal justice system. It 
is a kind of jurisdictional issue. Therefore, it would not 
bother me too much if the burden of coming within this 
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"Looks like old Roberts decided to take it with him. " 
Some things you can take with you. 
Such as the enduring thanks of your family and your law school for 
having remembered both with a single gift. 
The Pennsylvania parade of Planned Gifts includes bequests and 
trusts-e.g. , the Charitable Remainder Trust, Charitable Lead Trust and 
the OTIP (Qualified Terminable Interest Property) Trust. 
Gifts to the Law School can take the form of cash or securities, of 
course, but also real estate, life insurance, antiques, oil wells or oil 
paintings. 
Working with you, we can show you a dozen ways-some so fresh 
as to be downright exciting-to provide handsomely for those you love. 
To protect your property from harsh taxation. And to produce lasting 
help to the school that played no small part in your lifetime success. 
Planned Giving 
Programs 
University of Pennsylvania 
Law School 
3400 Chestnut Street 
Philadelphia, PA 191 04 
(215) 898-7 489 
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Let's Hear From You! 
We want "all the news that's fi to print" about you-professionally or other-
wise. The Journal's Alumni Briefs Section is the perfect forum for keeping in 
touch with classmates and Alumni. Information as well as your informal 
photographs are welcome. Please use the space below and return to the Law 
School in the attached envelope. 
Name and Class: _____________________ _ 
What's New: _____________________ _ 
27 
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The Faculty---------------------
Professor Paul Bender was Distin-
guished Visiting Lecturer in Law at the 
University of Alberta Law School in 
Edmonton, Canada, in January 1983. 
He lectured on the new Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which 
became part of the Canadian Constitu-
tion in April 1982. During the past year, 
Mr. Bender has given a paper on the 
Canadian Charter at conferences at 
Dalhousie University Law School , 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, and at the Uni-
versity of Western Ontario Law School , 
London, Ontario. This summer (and for 
three summers past), he will lecture on 
the United States Bill of Rights and the 
Canadian Charter at a Seminar for 
Canadian Lawyers conducted by the 
Canadian Human Rights Foundation. 
28 
Professor Bender's article on the 
United States Bill of Rights and the 
Canadian Charter is scheduled for 
spring 1983 publication by the McGill 
Law Journal. 
During this past semester, he taught 
a course to University of Pennsylvania 
undergraduates in the Equal Protection 
Clause. The course was part of the 
University's general honors program 
given primarily to Benjamin Franklin 
Scholars. 
Associate Professor and Associate 
Dean Stephen B. Burbank is a mem-
ber of the planning committee for the 
Third Circuit Judicial Conference. His 
article, " Procedural Rulemaking Under 
the Judicial Councils Reform and 
Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 
1980' : appears in the December 1982 
issue of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review. 
Associate Professor Henry 
Hansmann has written an article 
(coauthored by John M. Quigley) on 
" Population Heterogeneity and the 
Sociogenesis of Homicide" for publi-
cation in the September 1983 issue of 
Social Forces. Mr. Hansmann 
presented a paper, "The Current State 
of Law and Economics Scholarship" 
at a conference on The Place of Eco-
nomics in Legal Education in Denver, 
Colorado in October 1982. The paper 
will be published in the June 1983 
issue of The Journal of Legal 
Education. 
Professor George L. Haskins has 
returned to regular full-time teaching 
following a sabbatical research leave 
during which he completed three arti-
cles to be published in 1983. The ar-
ticles relate to "Inconvenience and the 
Rule For Perpetuities" (written for 
Festschrift honoring William Franklin 
Fratcher): " Lay Judges: Magistrates 
and Justices in Early Massachusetts" 
(written for History of the Massachu-
setts Legal Profession); and "Sources 
of the First Laws of Pennsylvania': Mr. 
Haskins was also working on the juris-
diction of English ecclesiastical courts 
and their influence on colonial laws in 
New England. 
In connection with the celebration 
of the 1 OOth Anniversary of Dalhousie 
University in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Mr. 
Haskins has been invited to give an 
address on sources of the early laws 
of the maritime provinces in Canada. 
Professor Louis B. Schwartz 
moderated a panel discussion on the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 
1982 in March. The discussion was 
presented as a " video teleconference" 
by the Federal Judicial Center (Pro-
fessor A. Leo Levin, Director) as part of 
its education and training program for 
federal judges, prosecutors, defenders, 
probation officers and others involved 
in criminal justice. Emanating from 
Washington, the panel discussion 
reached centers throughout the United 
States where interested officials gath-
ered to follow the discussion and to put 
questions back to the panelists. 
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Professor John 0. Honnold is the Arthur Goodhart Professor of the Science 
of Law at Cambridge University, England, for the year 1982-83. What follows is 
the letter sent by Mr. Honnold at holiday time to his friends at the Law School, 
which best explains his experiences. 
Dear Friends, 
After only three months here, America seems so far away! If I tell you a little 
of how things are here, maybe you will send some news to help us get back m 
touch. But I can't say that we're lonesome. Life has been too busy and 
delightful I 
This is the fifth week of the Fall ("Michaelmas ") Term, and already I almost 
feel at home teaching in the remarkable garment that is prescribed for this and 
other rites-a flowing black "thing" with "sleeves" (sewn up at the ends) that 
dangle below the knees. (There are slits at the elbow where the arms come 
out.) I give one of 26 year-long courses ("papers'') for graduate (LL.M.) can-
didates. The lectures-two hours a week-are traditionally des;gned to pomt 
the way for independent study; the chance to choose only 3 or 4 out of 10 to 
12 questions on the exam provides lee-way for independent study. (lsn 't that a 
good idea?) 1 have 30 or so students, a relatively large group. Most are from 
abroad-a cross section of the old empire, w1th 8 to 10 from the U.S.A. 
1 have prepared "Cases & Materials" (mostly Commonwealth) to use as prob-
lems under the 1980 Sales Convention. In spite of warnings that there m1ght 
be resistance to a problem-discussion approach, I feel good about the start 
we have made. 
The deepest mystery is: Where is the "law school"? The only tangible 
center is a 3' round oaken table in the University "combination" (lounge) room 
that happens to be connected to the Squire Law Library. Each morning at 11 
(as Clarence [Morris} will recaiO those few who are nearbyyather aroun~ th1s 
little table for tea, and engage m a strange act1v1ty called conversation -the 
cheerful sharing and development of ideas. 
Don't get the idea that the Law Library is the "Ia~ school,~· for i_t has no 
class-rooms and there are no offices for admm1strat10n (Parkmson slaw . 
doesn't apply here) or faculty. Three of us are developing prescnpt1ve nghts m 
small tables. 
What is the secret? The COLLEGES, where the Dons receive colleagues 
and students in great living-rooms with fireplaces and bookshelves. But how 
can one do intensive research without a base in the library? So far I have no 
idea. (My college, Clare Hall, is small, modern, confined to graduate students 
and research scholars, receptive to wives and a complete delight!) . 
There is so much to tell, but I must close. Our house and garden are JUSt 
beautiful. Partridges and pheasants visit us although we are only a 15 mmute 
bike ride from the center of the University. The bike path goes alongs1de~ and 
sometimes through, pastures with cows and horses: In our little red English 
Fot:d Fiesta we have made ever-widening ventures mto the flat but charmmg 
country-side of East Anglia. Colleagues and other friends have been so kmd 
as to leave us breathless. 




'27 Philip Werner Amram of 
Washington, D.C. received the first 
prize of the Section of International 
Law and Practice of the American Bar 
Association for his work in private inter-
national law, particularly for his serv-
ices at the Hague Conferences and 
with the State Department's Advisory 
Committee. 
'28 Burton R. Laub of Carlisle, Penn-
sylvania was honored at ceremonies 
held at the Dickinson School of Law on 
March 5, 1983. He was Dean of that 
school from 1966 until his retirement in 
1974. Before going to Dickinson, he 
was a county prosecutor and judge in 
Erie, Pennsylvania. Mr. Laub was a 
member of the Judicial Advisory Com-
mittee of the Pennsylvania Council on 
Crime and Delinquency, was vice-
Chairman of the Supreme Court 
Criminal Procedural Rules Committee 
and was a member of the Pennsyl-
vania State Board of Law Examiners. 
He has written numerous articles for 
Keystone-Lawyer 's Desk Library of 
Practice. He was also instrumental in 
the establishment of the Common-
wealth Court of Pennsylvania and 
served as its first reporter. 
'29 Irvin Stander, a Referee in the 
Pennsylvania Bureau of Workmen's 
Compensation, has been appointed 
a Lecturer in Law in the Graduate 
Studies Division of the Temple Univer-
sity Law School , where he is teaching 
a 14-week course on " Pennsylvania 
Workers' Compensation Law and Prac-
tice." He also will deliver two lectures 
to University of Pennsylvania Law 
School Professor Edward Sparer's 
class on "OSHA and Workers' Com-
pensation". Mr. Stander is Chairman of 
the Workers' Compensation Committee 
of the Philadelphia Bar Association and 
a member of the Workers' Compensa-
tion Survey Committee of the Penn-
sylvania Bar Association. 
'31 JacobS. Richman was elected 
President of the Mid-Atlantic Region of 
the Zionist Organization of America. He 
is a partner in the Philadelphia firm of 
Richman & Richman. 
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Honorable Samuel J. Roberts 
became Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania on January 3, 
1983. In his address on that occasion, 
Judge Roberts reflected on the enor-
mous increase in the volume of litiga-
tion facing the Commonwealth's Court 
since he first became a judge in 1952. 
Justice Roberts will deliver the third 
Alumni Luncheon Lecture on Wednes-
day, April 27 at the PNB Concourse, 
Philadelphia. 
'32 Alexander F. Barbieri of Philadel-
phia tendered his resignation as Court 
Administrator of Pennsylvania on 
January 17, 1983. 
'36 David Berger, of the firm Berger 
& Montague, Philadelphia was ap-
pointed chairman of a special commit-
tee to recommend improvements in 
the U.S. Supreme Court procedure for 
the selection of cases. A former 
Chancellor of the Philadelphia Bar 
Association, Mr. Berger served a ten-
year appointment to the Committee 
that drafted the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
'38 Sylvan M. Cohen, of the Phila-
delphia firm Cohen, Shapiro, Polisher 
Shiekman & Cohen, received the 
Alumni Award of the University of 
Pennsylvania on Founder's Day, 
January 22, 1982. 
'40 Frank C. P. McGlinn was recently 
elected to a three-year term as Coun-
cillor of the Philadelphia Historical 
Society. He is Vice-President of 
Western Savings Bank, Philadelphia. 
Robert W. Sayre received this 
year's Fidelity Award from the Philadel-
phia Bar Association and Fidelity Bank. 
A partner in the firm Saul , Ewing, 
Remick & Saul , he was active in the 
creation and development of the Public 
Interest Law Center of Philadelphia 
and was cited for "service to the cause 
of justice in the metropolitan Philadel-
phia area'' and for promoting the pro-
vision of ' 'a full range of legal services 
to community groups traditionally 
without access to legal assistance" . 
'41 Bernard M. Borish, President of 
the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Alumni Society, was honored as one of 
the "Special Men of Women's Way" 
in February, 1983, having devoted his 
time and talents to the Women's Way 
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coalition, an umbrella organization for 
numerous Women's service agencies 
in Philadelphia. 
Michael C. Rainone, of the firm 
Rainone & Rainone, Philadelphia, was 
elected President of the Lawyer's Club 
of Philadelphia after serving two years 
as Vice-President. 
'42 Frederic L. Ballard of the 
Philadelphia firm Ballard, Spahr, 
Andrews & Ingersoll , was Honorary 
Co-Chair of An Evening at J. E. 
Caldwell honoring "Special Men of 
Women's Way" in February, 1983. 
'47 Frank B. Boyle is President-Elect 
of the Pennsylvania Bar Association. A 
distinguished practicing attorney for 35 
years in York, Pennsylvania, Mr. Boyle 
will be installed as President at the 
Pennsylvania Bar Association Meetings 
in May, 1983. 
Robert M. Landis, a partner in the 
Philadelphia firm of Dechert, Price & 
Rhoads, was recently named 1983 
Chairman of the Board of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. 
Honorable Alfred L. Luongo, 
Chief Judge of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, was honored by the 
Grand Lodge of Pennsylvania, Order 
of the Sons of Italy in America, at the 
Bellevue Stratford Hotel. 
Henry W. Sawyer was honored at 
the First Annual Civil Liberties Award 
Dinner, sponsored by the American 
Civil Liberties Unions of Pennsylvania 
and Greater Philadelphia. The noted 
civic leader and senior litigation partner 
in the Philadelphia law firm of Drinker, 
Biddle & Reath also spoke at Naturali-
zation Ceremonies sponsored by the 
Philadelphia Bar Association in De-
cember, 1982. Formerly on the staff of 
the U.S. Department of State, a Phila-
delphia Councilman-at-large and a 
Commissioner on the Delaware River 
Port Authority, he is now a member of 
the Board of Trustees of Americans for 
Democratic Action, the Academy of 
Music and the Philadelphia Orchestra. 
'48 Henry T. Reath, a senior part-
ner in the Philadelphia firm of Duane, 
Morris & Heckscher, received the 
American Judicature Society's Herbert 
Harley Award. The Honorable Arlin M. 
Adams, '47, presented the award, in 
recognition of Mr. Reath's efforts "to 
promote the effective administration of 
justice." A past Chairman of the Board 
of Governors of the Philadelphia Bar 
Association and former member of the 
House of Delegates of the Pennsyl-
vania Bar Association, Mr. Reath 
recently served as counsel to several 
common pleas courts in their efforts to 
establish more freedom in budgetary 
determination, and as a guest lecturer 
at the National Conference of Chief 
Justices of the State Supreme Courts. 
E. Eugene Shelly was named to 
honorary membership of the Chapel of 
Four Chaplains in Philadelphia. Active 
in the Rotary Club and in volunteer 
services to people of all races and 
faiths, Mr. Shelley is a partner in the 
law firm of Fluhrer, Medill and Shelley, 
York, Pennsylvania. 
'49 Honorable Louis J. Carter of 
Philadelphia has resigned as an Ad-
ministrative Judge with the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. He served as 
Chairman of the three-member Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board for the on-
going USNRC public hearing on the 
safety of operations at Units 2 and 3 of 
the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station 
near Buchanan, N.Y. 
M. Stuart Goldin, a partner in the 
Philadelphia firm of Isenberg, Goldin & 
Blumberg, is Co-Chairman of the 1983 
Luncheon Lecture Committee of the 
Professional Education Section of the 
Philadelphia Bar Association. 
Thomas A. Mcivor is now practic-
ing in Paris, France. Concentrating 
primarily on international tax law, he 
was formerly with the U.S. State De-
partment. 
'51 Arthur R. Littleton, a partner in 
the Philadelphia firm of Morgan, Lewis 
& Bockius, was elected to a three-year 
term on the Board of Governors of the 
Philadelphia Bar Association. 
'52 Anthony S. Minisi, of the Phila-
delphia firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr & 
Solis-Cohen, was recently elected Vice-
Chairman on the Philadelphia Bar 
Association's Board of Governors. 
'53 Honorable Edward J. Bradley, 
President Judge of the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas, served as a 
faculty member during a recent sem-
inar on "Practice in the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas. " The seminar 
was a review of the standard practices 
and procedures followed in handling 
civil action in the local common pleas 
court. 
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Theodore S. Coxe announced the 
relocation of his offices to 5448 Ger-
mantown Avenue, Philadelphia, PA. 
19144. 
'54 Robert Montgomery Scott of 
the Philadelphia firm Montgomery, 
McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, was ap-
pointed President and Chief Executive 
of the Philadelphia Museum of Art. 
'55 W. Thomas Berriman, of the King 
of Prussia, Pennsylvania firm of 
Berriman & Schwartz, was the course 
planner for the recent seminar on 
"Physicians and Hospital Relations: 
Cooperation and Conflict,'' sponsored 
by the Delaware Valley Hospital Coun-
cil and the Pennsylvania Osteo-Medical 
Association. 
John J. McCarty, a member of the 
Philadelphia firm of Raynes, McCarty, 
Binder & Mundy, was a featured 
speaker at the first 1983 "Case of the 
Month" program sponsored by the 
Philadelphia Trial Lawyers Association. 
'56 George L. Bernstein, chief ex-
ecutive officer of the international ac-
counting and consulting firm Laventhal 
& Horwath, announced the firm's 
mergers with CPA firms in Cleveland, 
Las Vegas and Los Angeles in 
November, 1982, bringing to 13 the 
number of mergers concluded in the 
past 19 months. 
Paul D. Guth, a senior partner in 
the Philadelphia firm of Blank, Rome, 
Comisky & McCauley, was nominated 
by President Reagan to be United 
States representative on the Joint 
Commission on the Environment estab-
lished by the Panama Canal Treaty of 
1977. Currently a Trustee of the 
Federation of Jewish Agencies and the 
Delaware Valley College of Science 
and Agriculture, he was elected a 
Delegate to the Republican National 
Convention in 1980 and acted as 
Chairman of Philadelphia County for 
the Committee to Re-elect Governor 
Thornburgh. 
Peter J. Liacouras, the Dean of 
Temple University Law School from 
1972-1983, is the seventh President 
of Temple University. 
'57 Stephen I. Richman of 
Washington, Pennsylvania is actively 
involved in work in the area of occupa-
tional lung disease law and litigation. 
Recently, he presented papers to the 
American Lung Association and to the 
American Thoracic Society at their An-
nual Joint Meeting, to a conference on 
the Federal Black Lung Program spon-
sored by the Energy Bureau, and to 
the Annual Joint Meeting of the 
American Society of Clinical Pathol-
ogists/College of American Patholo-
gists. Legal consultant to the Franklin 
Institute and contractor to the Depart-
ment of Labor in assisting it in comply-
ing with the Black Lung Revenue Act 
of 1981, he is the author of an article 
published in the December, 1981 issue 
of The Annals of Internal Medicine 
which explores the American systems 
of Worker's Compensation for occupa-
tional lung disease. 
'58 Howard Gittis, a partner in 
the firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-
Cohen was elected Chancellor of the 
Philadelphia Bar Association for 1983. 
At the Association's annual meeting in 
December, 1982, he marked as his 
main objectives for the 8,300-member 
Association the continuation and ac-
celeration of legal education and com-
munity outreach programs. 
'59 Alexander A. DiSanti of Media, 
Pennsylvania was elected President of 
the Delaware County Bar Association. 
Oscar N. Gaskins announced the 
reorganization of his firm Oscar N. 
Gaskins & Associates with offices in 
Suite 1310, the Robinson Building, 42 
South Fifteenth Street, Philadelphia, 
PA., 19102. 
Bernard M. Gross, president of 
the Philadelphia firm of Gross & Sklar, 
was elected to the post of Supreme 
Recorder of Tau Epsilon Rho Interna-
tional Legal Fraternity. 
Paul P. Oberly, of the firm of Saul, 
Ewing, Remick & Saul, Philadelphia, 
was elected a fellow of The American 
College of Probate Counsel. 
'60 Jesse Choper was appointed 
Dean of Boalt Hall, the law school of 
The University of California at Berkeley. 
Dean Choper was featured in the arti-
cle, "A Sure Bet at Boalt Hall" in the 
January 1 0, 1983 issue of The National 
Law Journal. 
John Jakubowski announced 
the relocation of the office of Smith & 
Jakubowski to 2001 PSFS Building, 
Philadelphia, PA 19107, and the open-
ing of new offices at 1330 Easton 
Road, Abington, PA 19001. 
'61 Paul R. Anapol, of the firm of 
Anapol, Schwartz, Weiss & Schwartz, 
P. C., 1900 Delancey Place, Philadel-
phia, PA 19103, served as a faculty 
member for a seminar entitled "Prac-
tice in the Philadelphia Court of Com-
mon Pleas", which reviewed the stand-
ard practices and procedures followed 
in handling civil action in the local 
common pleas courts. 
'62 Kenneth M. Cushman, of Pep-
per, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadel-
phia, is program co-chairman of the 
American Bar Association's Fidelity 
and Surety Law Committee, Tort and 
Insurance Practice Section which is co-
sponsoring a program with the Forum 
Committee on the Construction In-
dustry of the ABA entitled, "Bank-
ruptcy-Crisis in the Construction 
Industry". 
Richard B. Schwartz, of the firm of 
Anapol, Schwartz, Weiss & Schwartz, 
P. C., has relocated his office to 1900 
Delancey Place, Philadelphia, PA 
19103. 
'63 Steven A. Arbittier was a course-
planner and moderator at the full-day 
seminar presented by the Philadelphia 
Court of Common Pleas, the Pennsyl-
vania State Civil Judicial Procedures 
Committee of the Philadelphia Bar 
Association and the Pennsylvania Bar 
Institute entitled " Practice in the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. 
He is a member of the Philadelphia 
firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr and 
Solis-Cohen. 
David C. Auten, a partner in the 
Philadelphia firm of Reed, Smith , Shaw 
& McClay, was named Chairman of the 
Board of Stewards of the University of 
Pennsylvania's Christian Association. 
Currently serving as the National Chair-
man of Annual Giving for the Univer-
sity, he was presented with the Univer-
sity's Alumni Award of Merit in 1981. 
David H. Marion, Vice-President of 
Kahn, Savett, Marion & Graf, P. C., 
Philadelphia, was elected Vice-
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'64 William H. Platt was appointed by 
former Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Henry X. O'Brien to the 
Court's Criminal Procedural Rules 
Committee. Presently District Attorney 
for Lehigh County, a post he has held 
since 1976, Mr. Platt was formerly 
Chief Public Defender of Lehigh 
County. He is Chairman of the Lehigh 
County Criminal Rules Committee, and 
acts as state director for Pennsylvania 
in the National District Attorney's 
Association. 
'65 Harvey Bartle, Ill, of the Philadel-
phia firm of Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 
was named Vice-President of the Phila-
delphia firm Historical Society. 
William H. Ewing, of the Philadel-
phia firm of Goodman & Ewing, was 
honored as one of the "Special men of 
Womens' Way" in February, 1983. 
Sheldon Sandler, a partner in the 
firm of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & 
Taylor, Wilmington, Delaware, was 
recently designated Chairman of the 
Third Circuit Lawyers Advisory Com-
mittee for 1983 by Chief Judge Collins 
J . Seitz of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. Mr. 
Sandier is also the first Chairman of the 
newly-created Delaware State Bar 
Association Labor and Employment 
Law Section. 
'66 John M. Desiderio has become 
counsel to the firm of Scolari , Brevetti , 
Goldsmith & Weiss, P. C., 230 Park 
Avenue, New York, 10169. His article 
" Private Treble Damage Antitrust Ac-
tions: An Outline of Fundamental Prin-
ciples" has been published in 48 
Brooklyn Law Review 409 (1982) . Mr. 
Desiderio has been elected to the 
Board of Directors of The Opera 
Ensemble of New York. 
'67 Norman Pearlstine, of Brussels, 
Belgium , is editor and publisher of the 
Europe edition of the Wall Street Jour-
nal, and is responsible for the creation 
of that publication . Volume I, Number I 
of the newspaper appeared on Mon-
day, January 31 , 1983. Instrumental in 
several other overseas operations 
undertaken by the Journal, Mr. 
Pearlstine was the first managing editor 
of the Asian Wall Street Journal, and 
the first national news editor of the Wall 
Street Journal in New York. 
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Alan Spielman was the featured 
speaker at a lecture on entertainment 
law presented recently by the Lawyers 
for the Arts Committee of the Philadel-
phia Bar Association. 
Jonathan Stein has been ap-
pointed Acting Executive Director of 
Community Legal Services, Inc. , Phila-
delphia. An associate with CLS since 
1968 and formerly its Chief of Law 
Reform, Chief of Special Projects and 
Head of the Welfare and Health Law 
Unit, Mr. Stein was counsel in the U.S. 
Supreme Court case establishing the 
right of resident aliens to receive public 
assistance, and in the first decision 
establishing the right of blind teachers 
to teach in public schools. He was co-
founder of the Pennsylvania Judicial 
Selection Project to increase the 
numbers of women and minorities 
on the Bench. 
'68 Peter G. Glenn, after a decade as 
Professor of Law at the University of 
South Carolina, returned to the private 
practice of law as counsel to the firm of 
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 1700 
Union Commerce Building, Cleveland, 
Ohio 44115, as of May 10, 1983. Pro-
fessor Glenn was associated with that 
firm from 1969 to 1972. 
David H. Lissy was elected Assist-
ant Vice-President of Gulf+ Western In-
dustries, Inc., New York, having joined 
that organization in February 1982 as 
an Executive Assistant in the office of 
the Exect:Jtive Vice-President. Previ-
ously, he was with United Brands 
Company where he was an Assistant 
Vice-President. From 1969 to 1976, 
Mr. Lissy held a number of key 
governmental positions in Washington, 
including Special Assistant to President 
Gerald Ford and Associate Director of 
the White House Domestic Council. 
'69 William G. Adamson has 
become a member of the Philadelphia 
firm of Harvey, Pennington, Herting & 
Renneisen, Ltd. , Seven Penn Center 
Plaza, Fourth Floor, Philadelphia, PA 
19103. 
The Honorable Margaret 
Burnham was appointed National 
Director of the National Conference of 
Black Lawyers. Judge Burnham was 
the first Black woman to be appointed 
to the judiciary in Massachusetts and 
served for more than five years as a 
justice on the trial court there. A former 
staff attorney at the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund, and a civil rights and 
criminal defense practicioner, the 
Judge received national attention as 
an attorney on the team which 
represented Angela Davis in her 1970 
homicide prosecution. Judge Burnham 
joined the National Conference of 
Black Lawyers in 1969, founded the 
Boston Chapter of NCBL in 1973, and 
received the NCBL Judge of the Year 
Award in 1978. 
J. Greg Miller, of the firm of Pep-
per, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, 
spoke at an American Bar Association 
program on " Bankruptcy-Crisis in the 
Construction Industry" , co-sponsored 
by the Forum Committee on the Con-
struction Industry, and the Fidelity and 
Surety Law Committee of Tort and 
Insurance Practice Section. 
'70 Gary Tilles, former Chief of the 
Civil Division in the U.S. Attorney's 
Office, has become associated with the 
firm of Manchel, Lundy, Lessin & 
Busacca, Eighth Floor, The Robinson 
Building, 42 South Fifteenth Street, 
Philadelphia. 
Steven R. Waxman was named 
Secretary of the Philadelphia Bar Asso-
ciation . He is with the law firm of 
Bolger & Picker, Philadelphia. 
'71 Sheila Taenzler McMeen and E. 
Ellsworth McMeen, Ill, '72, are the 
parents of newborn twins, James 
Cunningham and Mary Josephine 
(January, 1983), Jonathan, age 5, and 
Daniel, age 3. Ms. McMeen is on leave 
from the New York City firm of Davis, 
Polk & Wardwell. 
'72 Ronald Clayton is a member of 
the firm of Fitzpatrick, Cella, Harper & 
Sciento, 277 Park Avenue, New York, 
New York 1 0172. · 
Mark D. Jonas has withdrawn from 
the firm of Hamburg, Rubin , Mullin & 
Maxwell , and has opened offices at 
Suite 400, One Montgomery Plaza, 
Norristown, PA 19401 . 
E. Ellsworth McMeen, Ill, and 
Sheila Taenzler McMeen, '71 , are the 
proud parents of Jonathan, age 5, 
Daniel , age 3 and twins, James Cun-
ningham and Mary Josephine (born 
January 1983). Mr. McMeen is a part-
ner in the firm of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby 
& MacRae, New York. 
Victor S. Perlman became a 
member of the firm of Clark, Ladner, 
Fortenbaugh & Young, 1818 Market 
Street, 32nd Floor, Philadelphia, PA 
19103. 
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David L. Pollack and Roslyn Goold 
Pollock, '73, of Radnor, Pennsylvania, 
became the parents of Richard Jacob 
on September 30, 1982. Mr. Pollack 
was elected to a three-year term on the 
Board of Governors of the Philadelphia 
Bar Association. 
Melvin R. Shuster, former Assist-
ant Chief of the Economic Crime Unit 
of the Philadelphia District Attorney's 
Office, is associated with the firm 
of Margolis, Edelstein, Scherlis & 
Kraemer, 1315 Walnut Street, Fourth 
Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19107. 
Richard Walden, who recently 
completed a five-year term as Commis-
sioner of the California Health Facilities 
Commission, is Executive Director of 
Operation California, Inc. He is in-
volved in a long-standing debate with 
the U.S. government over the human 
aspect of economic sanctions, espe-
cially those pertaining to the Foreign 
Assets Control Act, part of which sets 
L,Jp a special list of embargoed coun-
tries forbidden to receive developmen-
tal aid from private U.S. donors. 
'73 Michael R. Klekman has opened 
offices at 501 Fifth Avenue, New York, 
New York 1 0017, and is engaged in 
commercial litigation and general 
practice. 
Roslyn Goold Pollack and David 
L. Pollack, '72, of Radnor, Pennsyl-
vania, became the parents of Richard 
Jacob on September 30, 1982. 
'75 Beverly K. Rubman is associated 
with the Philadelphia firm of Goodman 
& Ewing, 1429 Walnut Street, Four-
teenth Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19102. 
'76 Sheryl L. Auerbach, of the 
Philadelphia firm of Dilworth, Paxson, 
Kalish & Kauffman , was a faculty 
member for the seminar " Practice in 
the Philadelphia Court of Common 
Pleas' '. 
Edward H. Merves, a former 
associate with the Philadelphia firm of 
Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley, 
was appointed Corporate Counsel and 
Assistant Secretary of the Industrial 
Valley Bank, Philadelphia. 
Glenn F. Rosenblum, a former 
Editor-in-Chief of Pennsylvania District 
and County Reports and a former law 
clerk to Judge Berel Caesar, '54, is as-
sociated with the firm of Korn, Kline & 
Kutner, 1521 Locust Street, Fifth Floor, 
Philadelphia, PA 19102. 
'78 Rudolph Ackeret (LL.M.) opened 
offices at Postsrasse 1 , Ch-8303 Bas-
sersdorf/Zurich , Switzerland. 
William F. Simms, Ill, is associated 
with the firm of Oscar N. Gaskins & 
Associates, P. C., Suite 1310, Robin-
son Building, 42 South Fifteenth Street, 
Philadelphia, PA 19102. 
Maurice L. White, Jr. became 
associated with the firm of Oscar N. 
Gaskins & Associates, P. C., Suite 
1310, Robinson Building, 42 South Fif-
teenth Street, Philadelphia, PA 19102. 
'79 Joseph C. Crawford, an 
associate in the firm of Schnader, 
Harrison, Segal & Lewis, Philadelphia, 
is the 1983 Chairperson of the Young 
Lawyers' Section of the Philadelphia 
Bar Association. 
Douglas Bern Fox and Deborah 
Large Fox, '80, became the parents of 
Kelly Anne on November 14, 1982. 
Donald M. Millinger, an asso-
ciate with the Philadelphia firm of Wolf, 
Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, has 
been appointed Adjunct Associate Pro-
fessor in the College of Humanities and 
Social Sciences at Drexel University. 
He will be teaching a course entitled 
"Art, Entertainment and the Law" for 
the Master of Science Degree in Arts 
Administration. 
M. Kelly Tillery formed the partner-
ship of Leonard, Tillery & Davison with 
offices at 1530 Chestnut Street, Fourth 
Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19102. 
'80 Richard D' Avino, an associate 
with the Washington , D.C. firm of 
Cohen & Uretz, has been appointed 
Adjunct Professor of Law at George-
town University School of Law. 
Deborah Davis is presently working 
in the Litigation Section of The Exxon 
Company in Houston, Texas. 
Paula Dow was previously with the 
East Texas Production Division of The 
Exxon Company and is now in 
Houston, Texas in Exxon 's Litigation 
Department. 
Charles F. Forer became asso-
ciated with the firm of Goodman & 
Ewing, 1429 Walnut Street, Fourteenth 
Floor, Philadelphia, PA 19102. 
Deborah Large Fox and Douglas 
Bern Fox, '79, became the parents of 
Kelly Anne on November 14, 1982. 
Brian Saunders is employed in the 
legal department at the Bayway (New 
Jersey) Refinery, The Exxon Company. 
'81 Shinichi Gotoh (LL.M .) and his 
wife, Mariko, became the parents of 
Dai-chi on August 12, 1982. 
Catherine Kessedjian Khachikian 
(LL.M.) joined the firm of Jeanclos, 
Lussan, Sammarcelli & Wiriath, 37, 
avenue Kleber, 75116 Paris. 
David Loder returned from a 
University of Pennsylvania-sponsored 
Thouron Fellowship for study in 
England. He received an LL.M . 
degree in international law at the 
London School of Economics, and is 
presently with for the firm Duane, 
Morris & Heckscher, Philadelphia. 
Frederick M. Stein became 
associated with the firm of Fox, 
Rothschild , O'Brien & Frankel, 2000 
Market Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103. 
Andre Van Landuyt (LL.M.) and his 
wife, Myriam, became the parents of 
Dimitri on December 7, 1982. 
'82 Twekiat Menakanist (LL.M .) 
was appointed a Director of the Gradu-
ate Program of the Faculty of Law, 
Thammasat University in Bangkok, 
Thailand . He received his masters' 
degree in Thailand and recently com-
pleted a book entitled Criminal Law 
and Its Problems which will be pub-
lished next year. 
Helen Milgate (LL.M .) has joined 
the firm of Herbert Smith & Company, 
Solicitors, at Watling House, Cannon 
Street, London, England. 
Dale L. Moore, law clerk to Judge 
Louis H. Pollak of the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, will be teaching next year at 
Albany Law School, Albany, New York. 
Deepest Apologies 
The Law Alumni Journal er-
roneously listed the Honorable Joseph 
T. Murphy, '36, on the "In Memoriam" 
page of the Winter 1983 issue. The in-
correct information came from the 
University's main office. 
Happily we disclaim what, in Judge 
Murphy's own words, was " a grossly 
exaggerated report" and affirm that 
Judge Joseph T. Murphy, '36, is alive 
and well and sitting on the Bench of 
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In Memoriam: 
James Hannon Chadbourn, Professor 
The University of Pennsylvania Law School 1936-1950 
Had Jim Chadbourn's career ended in 1950 when at 
age 45 he left Penn, he would have been remembered 
not only as a leading scholar in his chosen fields-not 
only as the supreme master of the law professor's art-
but as a teacher who, during the years 1936-50, put a 
lasting stamp on hundreds of Penn graduates who to-
day are active practitioners, judges and teachers. And 
yet in 1950, there was so much to come-a decade at 
UCLA and two decades at Harvard of continued 
brilliant teaching and of a prodigious outpouring of 
scholarly writing culminating in Jim's monumental revi-
sion of Wigmore. Jim died at Harvard on September 
28, 1982 at the age of 76. 
Jim's powers of mind and intellect were awesome. As 
a Harvard colleague has accurately noted, Jim was a 
great teacher precisely because he was a formidable 
scholar. And with all his magnificent abilities, Jim was a 
wise, witty, charming, and caring man. Although always 
friendly and accessible to students and colleagues 
alike, Jim remained a very private person. Knowing 
how deep his commitments would be, Jim gave his 
friendship sparingly. How fortunate and privileged then 
were we four at Penn-A. Leo Levin, Frederick G. 
Kempin, Jr., Barton E. Ferst and myself-to have been 
able to call Jim-friend. 
Harvard mourns its loss; and Penn mourns too. And 
in our mourning, I find consolation in knowing that Jim 
was very happy during his years here. It was because 
of Jim that my four years as student and instructor at 
Penn were halcyon days. It was also during his Penn 
years that Jim married his devoted Erika, and that their 
two daughters and son were born . In a letter in the 
Spring of 1976, already stricken with the cancer which 
he battled till he had completed his labors on the 
Wigmore revision, Jim wrote: 
One of the iron gates to Harvard Yard is inscribed 
"In Memory of the Dear Old Times'.' /like that. As I 
look back, my times at Penn were nothing less than 
"dear',' and the fun you and I had occupies a 
special niche in the memory. 
Mine was a law school marriage and, as a demonstra-
tion of our very deep affection and admiration for Jim, my 
wife and I gave our three sons the same middle name-
Chadbourn. Thus, we will always celebrate and remem-
ber the genius, humanity and joy of this rarest of men. 
Morris L. Weisberg, '47 
Partner, Blank, Rome, Comisky & McCauley 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
James H. Chadbourn graced the Penn Law faculty 
for fourteen years, from 1936 to 1950. He left behind a 
host of admirers and friends, former students who felt 
enriched by his teaching and grateful for the privilege 
of having known the man. Chad, as we called him, 
passed away in Cambridge, Massachusetts last Sep-
tember after more than half a century of teaching, 
writing and changing the law. 
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There have been many fitting tributes, including an 
issue of the Harvard Law Review dedicated to his 
memory. He was indeed an eminent scholar, a lumi-
nary who left his mark on the development of the law, 
primarily in evidence and procedure. But when Chad 
taught, his primary devotion was to his students. The 
press of projects and research yielded to his concern 
for the business of teaching . He spent endless hours 
honing the hypos, organizing the structure of the 
presentation, searching for the striking case to make a 
point. And he wanted the learning to be fun. I was one 
of many attracted to teaching by his example and I 
recall vividly the half-page of advice that arrived shortly 
before I taught my first class: " Let the students laugh a 
lot, " he urged, "not only at themselves, but also at 
you ." It was good advice, particularly when one had the 
example of the master to try to emulate. And what a 
master he was! How exhilarating an hour with him, 
whether at Penn or at U.C.L.A. or at Harvard! Nor did 
the humor substitute for rigor of analysis, or an under-
standing of history, or an appreciation of the practical 
implications of doctrine. 
His friendship knew no bounds, as so many have at-
tested. And he left a mark on people that, as another 
former student-turned-teacher put it, ''will yet affect . .. 
hundreds who will pass through the ... classrooms of 
his former students in the years to come." 
How rich the legacy! 
A. Leo Levin, '42, Professor of Law, 
The University of Pennsylvania Law School 
and Director, The Federal Judicial Center 
We hear a good deal these days about the ennui of 
second and third year law students. Part of the prob-
lem, it seemed to me, lies in the methods and quality of 
our teaching. We tend to assume that what appears to 
work in first-year classes will work in the later years. That 
may be, but only if one is as gifted a teacher as was 
Professor Chadbourn. Few of us are, and yet there are 
many who teach , or at least teach evidence, because of 
the profound infuence that Chadbourn had on them in 
the classroom . I am among them . His classes were un-
conventional. Fi rst, he was often late. Second, he paid 
little attention to the assigned cases. Third, he was 
amusing. By being amusing Chadbourn engaged his 
students' attention. Once he had it, he exposed the ab-
surdities and complexities of the law of evidence with 
such clarity and relish that ennui was impossible and 
learning was inevitable. 
Late in Professor Chadbourn's life, I had occasion to 
correspond with him about a question that had arisen in 
my research. Kind and helpful as always, he closed his 
letter: " It is good to know that you are at work at 3400 
Chestnut and that you like Ph iladelphia. I did, too." 
Stephen B. Burbank, 
Associate Professor and Associate Dean, 
The University of Pennsylvania Law School , 
Harvard Law School , '73 
In Memoriam 
'21 Joseph Smith 
Philadelphia, PA 
December 9, 1982 
'22 Franklin Bates 
Southampton, PA 
December 13, 1982 
'25 Morton Meyers 
Johnstown, PA 
December 5, 1982 
'29 Stanley B. Cooper 
Plymouth Meeting, PA 
January 13, 1983 
'36 Reuben Miller 
Philadelphia, PA 
December 30, 1982 
'38 Harry A. Greenberg 
Miami Beach, FL 
December 1, 1982 
Harris J. latta, Jr. 
Haverford, PA 
September 8, 1981 
'39 Joseph M. Kilgarif 
Philadelphia, PA 
February 1 , 1983 
'42 Mabel Ditter Sellers 
Ambler, PA 
February 18, 1983 
'48 Robert P. Shoemaker 
Waynesboro, PA 
December 6, 1982 
'51 Martin S. Goodman 
Meadowbrook, PA 
January 4, 1983 
'60 I. Grant lrey, Jr. 
Wayne, PA 
December 3, 1982 
35 
37
et al.: Law Alumni Journal
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
End Notes _____________________ _ 
36 
Stanley E. Biddle Jr.,-"Ventman '!_was reported 
by the Office of University Counsel as having been "bet-
ween fifty and sixty years old at the time of his death, 
was once a member of the United States Armed Forces 
and had family in the Philadelphia area. " 
Mr. Biddle was a well-known presence on the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania campus for the last decade and 
spent a great deal of his time at the Law School. 
Although he requested no handouts, many members of 
the Law School Community offered Mr. Biddle food, 
money and clothing. 
Two members of the Law School Administration, 
Registrar Gary Clinton and Assistant to the Dean Rae 
d i Blasi, raised money which was donated to a local 
shelter for the homeless in Mr. Biddle 's memory. In ad-
dition, Penn Law Students collected two hundred 
dollars which they gave to the Philadelphia Committee 
for the Homeless. 
Stanley E. Biddle, Jr., was buried at the Whitemarsh 
Memorial Park on March 14, 1983, next to his father, a 
suburban Philadelphia physician. 
Reflections on Ventman: 
a moral dilemma 
by Mark Kramer, '85 
I never spoke with him, but I thought a great deal 
about Ventman. His presence was a constant source of 
disquiet, and spurred me to examine myself and the 
education I was receiving . 
I wanted to speak with him because I was curious, 
but also because I wanted to acknowledge his dignity 
as a human being. Yet, I did not speak with him, for the 
same reason that I would hesitate to feed a stray dog-
lest he attach himself to me and, to my embarrassment, 
I find that I had unwittingly accepted a responsibility 
for him. 
So I discovered that I could walk past a hungry and 
desolate pariah nearly every day for months and take 
no action. I began to understand how the average 
bystander to a crime could let cowardice, embarrass-
ment and the lack of an obvious solution obscure clear 
moral obligation. I felt trivial emotions outweigh "deep 
values. ' ' And I wondered if I would be able to fulfill the 
responsibilities of a lawyer to his client and to society. 
My law school courses seemed inadequate in preparing 
me for that task. I felt as if I were being taught to use 
a dangerous weapon with no instruction about when its 
use was justified or what damage it could do. What I 
needed was a course on moral courage, and I 
wondered how many others needed it too. 
Ventman's constant and unaided presence at the 
Law School was a singularly strong metaphor for the 
lack of assistance which lawyers give to the needy in 
general. He was the reminder of a desperate world 
·which we privileged law students will hardly ever face, 
but which is far more prevalent than our experience 
would suggest. Although we espouse a responsibility 
for pro bono work, it is the rare graduate who actually 
assumes it. Is this the fault of the graduate, or IS 1t also a 
consequence of the Law School curriculum? . 
For me, Ventman provided a test of moral qual1ty. In 
failing it, I feel continuing turmoil. Perhaps it has caused 
me to be more conscientious about opportunities for 
public interest work. Of course, my idealism and 
discomfort will fade, as have other failures and resolu-
tions. But my legal education will be the less for his 
absence. 
Reprinted with permission of The Penn Law Forum, Vol. 
No. 5. , Thursday, February 17, 1983. 
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